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INTRODUCTION

Although intellectual property law is a relatively recent legal
innovation, it has from an early stage in its development possessed
an international dimension. Information-rich products have long
crossed borders, prompting interested countries to pursue at least
some intellectual property policymaking at an international level.
As far back as the late nineteenth century, this resulted in the
adoption of a group of multinational treaties that remain the
foundation of what can be called the public international law of
intellectual property.'
Efforts to develop a private international law of intellectual
property are much more recent, 2 and are ongoing in a number of
different institutional settings.3 Yet, the need for attention to this
field remains acute.4 These efforts raise a number of questions: the
content of current private international law in matters of intellectual property; the adequacy of that body of law in an increasingly
globalized environment; the changes that must be made to that body
of law; and the institutional means by which a private international
1. See Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, Sept. 9, 1886,
25 U.S.T. 1341, 1161 U.N.T.S. 3 (as last amended, July 24, 1971) [hereinafter Berne
Convention]; Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, Mar. 20, 1883, 21
U.S.T. 1583, 828 U.N.T.S. 305 (as last revised at Stockholm, July 14, 1967) [hereinafter Paris
Convention]; see also Madrid Agreement Concerning the International Registration of Marks
of Apr. 14, 1891 (1891), reprinted in GRAEME B. DINWOODIE ET AL., INTERNATIONAL
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW AND POLICY, DOCUMENTARY SUPPLEMENT 141 (2001). By public

international intellectual property law, I mean the network of obligations that exist between
or among nation-states or recognized groupings thereof, such as the European Union. See
Graeme B. Dinwoodie, A New Copyright Order: Why National Courts Should Create Global
Norms, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 469, 473 n.5 (2000) [hereinafter Dinwoodie, A New Copyright
Order] (noting challenges to the clarity of this definition).
2. Indeed, the existence of a private international law of intellectual property was called
into question by a leading scholar as recently as 1991. See P.B. Carter, Decisions of British
Courts During 1990, 61 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 386, 401-02 (1991) (noting the need for the
development of such a body of law in response to the decision of the U.K. courts in Tyburn
Productionsv. ConanDoyle).
3. See infra text accompanying notes 24-35.
4. See P.B. Carter, Preface to JAMES J. FAWCETY & PAUL TORREMANS, INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY AND PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW (1998) (commenting that "whatever the

explanation of the past failure of private international law to meet the need to accommodate
problems in the area of intellectual property, that need is compelling" and noting that the
need "has become even more pressing" as a result of advances in technology).
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law of intellectual property should be developed.5 This Article
explores the content of a private international law of intellectual
property, but does not seek to articulate a comprehensive scheme.
Rather, this exploration is intended to facilitate consideration of the
core principle of territoriality that informs so much of the existing
regime. Likewise, although I note the different means by which a
private international law of intellectual property is evolving, the
Article leaves for another day the institutional analysis of the
means by which such a law may best be developed.6
Part I sketches the basic principles of private international law
that apply in transborder intellectual property disputes, examining
treaty provisions and developments at the national and regional
level. In this analysis, it is important to look beyond instruments or
doctrines that explicitly bear the label of "private international law."
Some of the leading questions are highlighted by discussion of six
recent transborder intellectual property disputes. These disputes
help to illustrate aspects of cross-border exploitation of intellectual
property that need to be taken into account both in critiquing
current approaches and in formulating alternatives.
Part II turns to focus on the concept of territoriality.
Territoriality is a principle that has always received excessive
doctrinal purchase in intellectual property law. One can adhere to
the basic premises that underlie territoriality without supporting
5. As in public international intellectual property law, there has been a proliferation of
actors seeking to shape policy. This phenomenon on the public international side of the
picture has already received scholarly attention. See JOHN BRAITHWAITE & PETER DRAHos,
GLOBAL BUSINESS REGULATION 564 (2000) (suggesting different forms of "forum-shifting");
Laurence R. Heifer, Regime Shifting: The TRIPs Agreement and New Dynamics of
InternationalIntellectualPropertyLawmaking, 29 YALE J. IN'L L. 1, 13-18 (2004) (discussing
"regime-shifting"); see also Graeme B. Dinwoodie, The Institutionsof InternationalIntellectual
Property Law: New Actors, New Institutions, and New Sources, PROC. OF THE 98TH ANN.
MEETING OF THE AM. SOCY OF INTL L. 213 (2004) (discussing the proliferation of institutions
on both the public and private side), reprintedin 10 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REv. 205, 205-06,
210 (2006) [hereinafter Dinwoodie, Institutions]. Should development of this area of law be
pursued through soft law models that are becoming more significant components of the
international legal regime? Should lawmaking initiatives be established at the international
level, or would a network of cooperating national actors be preferable? I address these choices
in a separate paper that advances the claims of dialogic lawmaking, its challenges, its
advantages, and the institutional design questions that will facilitate its full role in the
lawmaking toolbox.
6. Institutional questions may significantly affect the content of private international
intellectual property law in a number of ways. See infra note 240.
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the full range of rules of intellectual property law that are said to
reflect the principle. Moreover, the normative force of the principle
has declined as units of social and commercial organization have
come to correspond less neatly with national borders, and as private
ordering has weakened the capacity (and perhaps the claim) of the
nation-state exclusively to determine the behavior of its citizenry.
Finally, many of the same values (for example, diversity of legal
regimes, tailoring of intellectual property to local needs, and
protecting rights on an international basis) that the public international intellectual property system sought to further through its
promulgation of the principle of territoriality can now best, and
perhaps only, be achieved by reconfiguring the principle.7
This Article approaches the task of reconfiguration in two ways.
First, in Part II, it explores some of the different ways in which the
principle of territoriality might conceptually inform a private
international law of intellectual property. Contemporary multiterritorial intellectual property disputes are characterized by an
excess of sharedbut weaker prescriptive and adjudicatory authority.
The Article suggests a restrained concept of territoriality that
reflects that reality, drawing in particular from the treatment of
extraterritoriality in trademark law. Part III. of the Article approaches the question less conceptually and addresses reform of a
specific principle of private international intellectual property law:
limits on consolidated adjudication of infringement claims under
domestic and foreign intellectual property laws.

7. A vibrant private international law, which recognizes the expressive and constitutive
capacity of judicial decision making, can make contributions to the intellectual property
system well beyond the resolution of private disputes. In urging that courts consciously act
upon that potential, I argue for a fuller appreciation of the role of dialogue as a lawmaking
institution, both in developing and implementing a private international intellectual property
law. Moreover, allowing the development of international norms through creative private
international law approaches may present the opportunity to break impasses that are now
developing in almost every intellectual property lawmaking context. See Graeme B.
Dinwoodie, The InternationalIntellectualPropertySystem: Treaties,Norms, National Courts,
and Private Ordering,in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT: STRATEGIES To
OPTIMIZE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN ATRIPS-PLus ERA 59, 84-92 (Daniel Gervais ed., 2007)

(discussing impasses).
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I. THE PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
A. Public Private InternationalIntellectual Property Law
To assess the wisdom of current initiatives to develop a private
international law of intellectual property, we must start with what
exists. At first blush, this might seem somewhat meager. There is
no treaty comprehensively, or even purposefully, addressing the
private international law of intellectual property. The provisions
resembling conflicts principles found in instruments of substantive
(public) international intellectual property law are scattered and
episodic, and appear to have been adopted without serious efforts to
relate the rule articulated or implied to any general coherent
principle of private international law.
For example, some scholars and courts read the core international
copyright obligation of national treatment found in Article 5(1)
of the Berne Convention as implicating a principle of territoriality
and from that, a rule regarding choice of law.' Yet, as the Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit has pointed out, consistent with the
views expressed by the European Court of Justice,9 "the principle of
national treatment is really not a conflicts rule at all; it does not
direct application of the law of any country. It simply requires that
the country in which protection is claimed must treat foreign and
domestic authors alike."1 To be sure, the principle of national
treatment does generally suggest that national intellectual property
8. See Berne Convention, supra note 1, art. 5(1) (providing that "authors shall enjoy, in
respect of works for which they are protected under this Convention, in countries of the Union
other than the country of origin, the rights which their respective laws do now or may
hereafter grant to their nationals, as well as the rights specially granted by this Convention").
9. See Case C-28/04, Tod's SpA v. Heyraud SA, 2005 E.C.R. 1-05781 (suggesting that "as
is apparent from Article 5(1) of the Berne Convention, the purpose of that convention is not
to determine applicable law").
10. Itar-Tass Russian News Agency v. Russian Kurier, Inc., 153 F.3d 82, 89 n.8 (2d Cir.
1998); see also 2 SAM RICKETSON & JANE C. GINSBURG, INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT AND
NEIGHBOURING RIGHTS: THE BERNE CONVENTION AND BEYOND § 20.08 (2d ed. 2005)
(suggesting how to draw some meaning from Article 5(1) for conflicts purposes); Phillip
Johnson, Which Law Applies: A Reply to Professor Torremans, 1 J. INTELL. PROP. L. & PRAc.
71, 72 (2005) (arguing that the "national treatment principle ... only requires the same conflict
of laws rules to be applied to both foreigners and nationals").

2009]

THE DEMISE OF TERRITORIALITY?

717

laws should determine rights based on place rather than nationality," but this is a very general philosophy with little specific
content.
Indeed, if the general principle of national treatment did impose
a particular choice-of-law rule, this could be of broad significance.
The principle of national treatment is not only a foundation of the
Paris and Berne Conventions, but also was reaffirmed in the TRIPS
Agreement in 1994.12 In fact, one leading treatise suggests that the
slightly more elaborate national treatment provision of the TRIPS
Agreement might limit the choice-of-law rules that a country may
adopt."3 Although subsequent elaboration of that view by one of the
treatise authors reveals that the limit on national autonomy that
the treatise contemplates would be a small one,' 4 two aspects of the
debate regarding the effect of Article 3 of the TRIPS Agreement are
worth noting for present purposes (in addition to the fact that any
limits are small). First, to attach a private international law
significance to Article 3, one has to parse the definition of "protection" found in a footnote to Article 3.15 This hardly suggests a
11. See Graeme B. Dinwoodie, Trademarksand Territory:DetachingTrademarkLaw from
the Nation-State, 41 Hous. L. REv. 885, 891-92 (2004) [hereinafter Dinwoodie, Trademarks
and Territory]; see also Graeme B. Dinwoodie, Conflicts and International Copyright
Litigation: The Role of InternationalNorms, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE CONFLICT OF
LAWS 195, 201 (Jiirgen Basedow, Josef Drexl, Anette Kur & Axel Metzger eds., 2005)
[hereinafter Dinwoodie, The Role of International Norms] ("[T]he national treatment
obligation of the Berne Convention suggests that foreign nationality should not result in
lesser rights, and thus suggests that some notion of 'place' (rather than nationality) should
be controlling. But even if this hint were meant to operate as a choice of law rule, it is not
clear which 'place' is the most relevant.").
12. See Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights art. 3, April
15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, 1869
U.N.T.S. 299, 33 I.L.M. 1197 (1994) [hereinafter TRIPS Agreement]; Berne Convention, supra
note 1, art. 5(1); Paris Convention, supra note 1, art. 2. See generally Graeme B. Dinwoodie,
The Architecture of the InternationalIntellectual Property System, 77 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 993,
995 (2002).
13. See FAwcETr & TORREMANs, supra note 4, at 481 ("All convention provisions must be
interpreted as adhering to the general rule that the law of the protecting country is the
applicable law ....
Any alternative interpretation favouring the application of the law of the
country of origin or the law of the forum as a general rule is no longer acceptable.").
14. See Paul Torremans, Which Law Applies?A Reply from ProfessorTorremansto Phillip
Johnson'sReply to His EarlierWork, 1 J. INTELL. PROP. L. & PRAc. 76, 76 (2005) (arguing that
Article 3 precludes "the application of a lex originis-based approach to choice of law across the
board").
15. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 12, art. 3 n.3.
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conscious attempt to create a rule of private international law.
Second, the limits that Article 3 imposes, such as they are, operate
as a constraint on the choice-of-law rules that a state may adopt.
They do not mandate a particular rule. 6
As if to emphasize the dubiety of locating private international
law rules in intellectual property treaties, over a century of debate
has not resolved whether Article 5(2) of the Berne Convention even
speaks to choice of law or, if it does, what it says. 17 Yet, that provision is clearly cast in language that resembles a conflicts rule: it
provides that "the extent of protection, as well as the means of
redress afforded to the author to protect his rights, shall be
governed exclusively by the laws of the country where protection is
claimed."' 8 The majority view is that Article 5(2) endorses the lex
loci protectionis, but this is not without objection from some commentators,' 9 and the number of issues to which it applies is also a
point of debate. 20 Finally, the few narrow provisions regarding
private international law that do exist in intellectual property
treaties are often stated without clarity and with no regard for how
they might gel with more general principles. 2'
These observations largely hold true at the regional level as
well, where intellectual property instruments have barely touched
on questions of conflicts.22 As a result, there is almost no "public
16. Id. art. 3.
17. See generally 2 RICKETSON & GINSBURG, supra note 10, §§ 20.08-10 (canvassing the
literature and the debate); MIREILLE VAN ECHOUD, CHOICE OF LAW IN COPYRIGHT AND
RELATED RIGHTS: ALTERNATIVES TO THE LEX LocI PROTECTIONIS (2003).

18. See Berne Convention, supra note 1, art. 5(2).
19. Article 5(2) could be read to institute a rule of lex fori because the forum is "the
country where protection is claimed." See id. But the accepted reading of the provision is that
it refers to the country in respect of which protection is claimed, that is, where infringement
is alleged to have occurred. See Graeme W. Austin, Domestic Laws andForeignRights: Choice
of Law in TransnationalCopyright Infringement Litigation, 23 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 1,
24-25 (1999) [hereinafter Austin, Domestic Laws].
20. See infra Part I.C.1.
21. See Berne Convention, supra note 1, art. 14bis(2)(a) (ownership of copyright in
cinematographic works); see also Itar-Tass Russian News Agency v. Russian Kurier, Inc., 153
F.3d 82, 91 n.12 (2d Cir. 1998) (noting lack of any general lesson to be drawn from Article
14bis).
22. There are exceptions, of course, discussed infra text accompanying notes 56-59
(discussing Cable and Satellite Directive). At the regional level, there are a greater number
of generally applicable private international law instruments, such as the Brussels
Convention and Regulation in Europe. See infra notes 26-35.
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private international law, 23 of intellectual property. In the last few
years, however, several initiatives have been undertaken that would
start to build one. Some of these were general private international
law projects of which the provisions relating to intellectual property
were a small (but highly contested) part. For example, in 1991 the
Hague Conference on Private International Law, at the request of
the United States, embarked on a quest to negotiate a jurisdiction
and judgments convention of general applicability in civil and
commercial matters.2 4 Those efforts floundered in 2000-2001, in
large part due to disagreement over how to handle intellectual
property cases, forcing the Conference to scale back its efforts and
concentrate on a convention validating exclusive choice-of-court
clauses in business-to-business contracts.2 5
At the same time, the European Union (EU), newly invested with
competence in matters of private international law by the Treaty of
Amsterdam, transformed the older European Brussels Convention
(on jurisdiction and judgments) 26 and Rome Convention (on choice
of law relating to contractual obligations)2 7 into formal EU instruments. The EU also tackled the law applicable to noncontractual
23. See Stephen B. Burbank, Jurisdictional Equilibration, the Proposed Hague
Convention, and Progressin National Law, 49 AM. J. COMP. L. 203, 204 (2001).
24. Hague Conference on Private Int'l Law, Preliminary Draft Convention on
International Jurisdiction and Foreign Judgements in Civil and Commercial Matters (adopted
Oct. 30, 1999), available at http://www.hcch.net/upload/wop/jdgm2001draft-e.pdf; Hague
Conference on Private Int'l Law, April 1997, International Jurisdiction and Foreign
Judgements in Civil and Commercial Matters,Preliminary Doc. No. 7 (preparedby Catherine
Kessedjian), available at http://www.hcch.net/upload/wop/jdgm-pd7.pdf; Hague Conference
on Private Intl Law, Summary of the Outcome of Discussions in Commission II of the First
Part of the Diplomatic Conference, June 6-20, 2001, reprinted in 77 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 1015
(2002).
25. This narrow convention was adopted in 2005. See infra note 38.
26. Convention on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and
Commercial Matters, Sept. 27, 1968, 1972 O.J. (L 299) 32, amended by 1990 O.J. (C 189) 1,
reprinted as amended in 29 I.L.M. 1413 (1990) [hereinafter Brussels Convention]; Council
Regulation No. 44/2001 of 22 December 2000, on Jurisdiction and the Recognition and
Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, 2001 O.J. (L 12) 1 (EC)
[hereinafter Brussels 1].
27. See Rome Convention of 1980 on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations, Oct.
9, 1980, 1980 O.J. (L 266) 1; Commission of the European Communities, Proposal for a
Regulation of the EuropeanParliamentand the Council on the Law Applicable to Contractual
Obligations(Rome IProposal)COM (2005) 650 final (Dec. 15, 2005); Regulation No. 593/2008
of 17 June 2008, on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations (Rome 1), 2008 O.J. (L 177)
6 (EC).
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obligations, including in intellectual property actions.2" Although
this process was initially intended in large part to bring the old
treaties fully within the EU infrastructure, it prompted substantial
debate; again, intellectual property was a focal point of discussion.
Finally, as these generally applicable initiatives gained the
interest, but assuredly not the assent, of the intellectual property
community, scholars and private lawmaking bodies took up the
challenge issued by members of the Hague Conference and started
work on proposals that were consciously aimed at the peculiar
demands of intellectual property disputes. Professors Rochelle
Dreyfuss and Jane Ginsburg first proposed a treaty that was
consciously modeled on the failed (broad) Hague Convention, but
tailored to problems presented by transborder intellectual property
disputes.2 9 When that proposal attracted the attention of the
American Law Institute (ALI), which adopted it as its own, the form
of the Dreyfuss/Ginsburg proposal changed.3 ° Reflecting its location
outside the context of state-to-state negotiations, the proposed
treaty assumed the form of soft law principles and addressed choice
of law in addition to the questions of jurisdiction and judgments
that had been inherited from the draft Hague Convention. 3'
28. See CommissionProposalfor a Regulation of the EuropeanParliamentand the Council
on the Law Applicable to Non-ContractualObligations(Rome II Proposal), COM (2003) 427
final (July 22, 2003); Regulation No. 864/2007 of July 31, 2007 on the Law Applicable to NonContractual Obligations (Rome II), 2007 O.J. (L 199) 40, art. 8 (EC) [hereinafter Rome II].
29. See Rochelle C. Dreyfuss & Jane C. Ginsburg, Draft Convention on Jurisdiction and
Recognition of Judgments in Intellectual Property Matters, WIPO Doc. No. PIL/01/07 (2000),
available at http://wipo.int/edocs/mdocs/mdocs/enwipo-pil_01_7.doc [hereinafter Dreyfuss &
Ginsburg, Draft Convention]; Rochelle C. Dreyfuss and Jane C. Ginsburg, Draft Convention
on Jurisdictionand Recognition of Judgments in Intellectual Property Matters, 77 CHI.-KENT
L. REV. 1065, 1065-66 (2002).
30. See AM. LAW INST., INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: PRINCIPLES GOVERNING JURISDICTION,
CHOICE OF LAW, AND JUDGMENTS IN TRANSNATIONAL DISPUTES (2008) [hereinafter ALI
PRINCIPLES]. Reference is also made in this Article to AM. LAW INST., INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY: PRINCIPLES GOVERNING JURISDICTION, CHOICE OF LAW, AND JUDGMENTS IN
TRANSNATIONAL DISPUTES (Discussion Draft, 2006), and AM. LAW INST. INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY: PRINCIPLES GOVERNING JURISDICTION, CHOICE OF LAW, AND JUDGMENTS IN
TRANSNATIONAL DISPUTES (Proposed Final Draft, 2007).
31. See Rochelle Dreyfuss, The ALI Principles on TransnationalIntellectual Property
Disputes: Why Invite Conflicts?, 30 BROOK. J. INTVL L. 819, 820-26 (2005) (providing full
etymology of the principles). The draft Dreyfuss-Ginsburg treaty had addressed choice of law
prior to its adoption as an ALI project. See Dreyfuss & Ginsburg, Draft Convention, supra
note 29.
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Moreover, reflecting the inevitably international nature of the project, the ALI appointed a European scholar, Frangois Dessemontet,
as a co-reporter, along with Professors Dreyfuss and Ginsburg, and
assembled a thoroughly international group of advisers. The
Principles were adopted by the ALI at its annual Meeting in San
Francisco in May 2007 and have already been cited by U.S. courts.3 2
Despite (or, perhaps, because of) the efforts of the ALI to internationalize its initiative,3 3 groups of scholars in other countries have
commenced their own work in this field, including most notably the
Max Planck European Group on Conflicts of Law/Intellectual
Property (CLIP).3 4 Although these groups are formally producing
rival sets of principles, there is substantial cooperation and
communication among the different groups, aided in part by some
overlap in membership. 5

32. See Fairchild Semiconductor Corp. v. Third Dimension, 589 F. Supp. 2d 84, 89-90 (D.
Me. 2008).
33. This is a general trend in the activities of the ALI, and indeed a priority of the
Institute, reflecting the nature of modern law. See AM. LAW INST., RULES OF TRANSNATIONAL
CIVIL PROCEDURE (2004); AM. LAW INST., TRANSNATIONAL INSOLVENCY PROJECT (2000).
34. The CLIP Working Group is a joint initiative of the Max Planck Institute for
Intellectual Property and Competition Law in Munich and the Max Planck Institute for
Comparative and International Private Law in Hamburg. See Annette Kur, Applicable Law:
An Alternative Proposal for International Regulation-The Max Planck Project on
International Jurisdictionand Choice of Law, 30 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 951, 955-58 (2005);
Annette Kur, Jurisdictionand Enforcement of ForeignJudgments: The General Structure of
the MPI Proposal,in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW: HEADING
FORTHE FUTURE 21, 21-24 (Josef Drexl & Annette Kur eds., 2005). The work of this group was
also intended to provide input to the Europe-based Intellectual Property in Transition
Research Programme ("the Stockholm Group"), which was discussing the possibility of a
revised version of the TRIPS Agreement.
35. In addition, a group of Japanese academics have recently commenced a parallel
project. Cf. Toshiyuki Kono, Intellectual PropertyRights, Conflict of Laws and International
Jurisdiction:Applicability of ALI Principles in Japan?, 30 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 865, 865-66
(2005) (discussing applicability of ALI Principles in Japan). Although the ALI project took the
form of a soft law initiative, the ALI invited representatives of the World Intellectual Property
Organization and the Hague Conference on Private International Law (who were formally
liaisons to the project) to each advisers' meeting, taking advantage both of the wisdom
accumulated during the Hague process and ensuring a direct link with the traditional
intergovernmental organizations that could help with the broader adoption of the Principles.

WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 51:711

B. Taking a Broader View
Contemplating the existence and further development of a public
private international law of intellectual property might be too
narrow an inquiry into the means by which regulation of intellectual property occurs in the context of a transborder dispute.3 6
Approached more broadly, principles of private international law
relevant to intellectual property clearly do exist, and are growing in
number and complexity with every passing year.37 Moreover, it is in
the nature of much private international law to develop without a
foundation in international treaties. To be sure, the Hague Conference on Private International Law tirelessly works toward the
adoption of instruments in the field in general, but the most
effective work of the Hague Conference has been in very particular

36. Of course, it also excludes from consideration the principles of public international
intellectual property law proper, which have for some time had a substantial effect on the
regulation of intellectual property on a worldwide basis. That effect has only grown since the
conclusion of the TRIPS Agreement in 1994, and with the efforts to promote a "TRIPS plus"
agenda through bilateral trade agreements. See Dinwoodie, Institutions,supranote 5, at 209.
In this Article, I reference these classic public law developments only insofar as relevant to
the development of private international law. See, e.g., supratext accompanying notes 8-21.
By this limited engagement with public international law, I do not mean to minimize the
importance of public law developments. Most commentators would agree that these
developments have in large part defined the field. As a result, achieving an optimal level of
intellectual property protection also requires attention to reform of public international law.
(And the direction of public international intellectual property law will heavily influence how
much work needs to, or can, be done by private international law. For example, recent focus
on criminal penalties and enhanced enforcement might tend to limit the role of private
international law. Criminal actions have always been beyond the remit of conflicts rules, and
there territoriality is even more strictly enforced). Rather, here I focus on the development
of the private international law of intellectual property because its role in effecting global
regulation has been underappreciatedby scholars and policymakers to date.
37. See supra text accompanying notes 24-35.
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areas such as family law.3" Public private international law instruments of general application are hard to find.
Despite that, private international law abounds. Courts routinely
are entangled in questions of jurisdiction, choice of law, and
(perhaps to a lesser extent) recognition and enforcement of judgments, the basic fields of private international law. Private international rules have classically been rules of local law, not international law at all in the Benthamite sense.39 Thus, if we broaden our
inquiry to consider developments at the national or regional level
that address the ability of courts to exercise adjudicatory authority
over transborder intellectual property disputes, that seek to articulate the law applicable to such disputes, or that determine whether
a local court should recognize or enforce the judgment of a foreign
court in an intellectual property dispute, we find a much richer body
of law.4"
To be sure, one should not overstate the existence or depth of
this existing body of law. Even when adopting a broader perspective, the extent of private international intellectual property law is
slight compared to other fields. Until very recently, there was very
little case law or statutory rules,4 ' and surprisingly little scholar
38. See Hague Conference on Private International Law, http://www.hcch.net (last visited
Oct. 21, 2009); see also Ronald A. Brand, Intellectual Property,Electronic Commerce and the
PreliminaryDraft HagueJurisdictionand Judgments Convention, 62 U. PrIT. L. REV. 581, 582
(2001) (discussing the spotty record of the Hague Conference in developing a generally
applicable convention on jurisdiction and judgments in civil and commercial matters). As
noted above, a recent Hague Choice of Court Convention validates and requires enforcement
of exclusive choice-of-court clauses in business-to-business contracts. (In essence, the treaty
seeks to extend the model of the New York Convention on Recognition of Arbitral Awards to
the court system.) See Hague Convention on Exclusive Choice of Court Clauses, June 30,
2005, 64 I.L.M. 1291, 1291-96. Its scope encompasses clauses in contracts relating to
intellectual property.
39. See FRIEDRICH K. JUENGER, CHOICE OF LAW AND MULTISTATE JUSTICE 4 (1993).
40. For statutory rules, see, for example, Code of Private International Law of July 16,
2004 (Belg.).
41. As with the scattered provisions regarding choice of law in treaties, the rules that do
exist in national intellectual property statutes are often unenlightening. For example,
§ 104A(b) of the U.S. Copyright Act, which restored copyright in certain works that were in
the public domain because of noncompliance with formalities of U.S. law, provides that
ownership of copyright in a restored work vests "in the author or initial rightholder of the
work as determined by the law of the source country of the work," which the statute then
defines. 17 U.S.C. § 104A(b) (2006). However, is this provision an exception to an unstated
general rule, or merely an affirmation in this specific context of the rule that Congress wished
to adopt? In light of this uncertainty, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has refused
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ship.42 Without rehearsing fully the many reasons that might
explain this vacuum, 43 it is certainly true that most of the relevant
developments have occurred in the last fifteen to twenty years. Only
now are there substantial scholarly efforts to organize the field, only
now are courts consciously rendering decisions that addrbss
intellectual property through a private international lens, and only
now are policymakers beginning to make some halting progress in
bringing together two of the most maddeningly and fascinatingly
complex fields of law.
By the same token, in assessing what private international
intellectual property law currently exists, one must also bear in
mind that sometimes rules of private international law do not come
labeled as such. The private international dimension of substantive
laws is often hidden, implicit in the legislative edict or judicial
decision. Indeed, one of the tasks assumed by early scholars of
private international law-most particularly, in choice of law-was
to deduce from the nature of the substantive law a guiding principle
regarding the scope of its application. 44 This endeavor, which
defined the statutist approach and which has adherents still, gave
rise to principles of private international law, often by force of
necessity as courts and writers were by the circumstance of foreign
commerce or conquest required to consider the reach of local laws.4 5
The formalistic nature of the statutist approach, at least in its
early incarnations, was subjected to trenchant criticism. 46 But
intellectual property laws were relatively immune from even that
type of inquiry because public international intellectual property
laws had from the late nineteenth century supplied what most
scholars and courts had assumed to be a rule of clear application,

to draw general significance from this provision. See Itar-Tass Russian News Agency v.
Russian Kurier, Inc., 153 F.3d 82, 90 n.10 (2d Cir. 1998).
42. See Graeme B. Dinwoodie, InternationalIntellectual PropertyLitigation:A Vehicle for
Resurgent Comparativist Thought?, 49 AM. J. COMP. L. 429, 433-35 (2001) [hereinafter
Dinwoodie, InternationalIntellectual PropertyLitigation] (noting scholarship that existed).
43. For a fuller effort, see id. at 430-38.
44. See JUENGER, supra note 39, at 12-15.
45. See id.
46. See id. at 15 ("For centuries, useless disputes raged about how particular laws should
be characterized, until conflicts scholars realized that the statutists' taxonomic obsession was
a sure indication of unilateralism's failings.").
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namely, the principle of territoriality.4" That principle is somewhat
more chameleon-like than most scholars assume.4" Its protean
nature serves only to obscure the real grounds for decisions in this
area and to forestall the development of a genuine private international law reflecting the complexity demanded by contemporary
exploitation of intellectual property. The territoriality principle
could have been parsed to reveal a number of subsidiary propositions, reflecting different but legitimate policy concerns, but this did
not happen.4" The perceived or claimed clarity of the territoriality
principle largely precluded such scholarly or judicial inquiry.5 °
These subsidiary propositions, hidden by unquestioning incantation of the principle of territoriality, include a number of principles
that truly are in the nature of rules of private international law, the
central examples of which are discussed immediately below. Yet
many substantive rules of intellectual property law, formulated
without any eye to issues of private international law, have by
necessity been subjected to arguments that cause the (often
unintentional) deduction of a rule of private international law." In
47. See Dinwoodie, InternationalIntellectual Property Litigation,supra note 42, at 437.
The invocation of that premise still often frustrates the type of nuanced private international
law analysis found in other areas of law. See infra text accompanying notes 86-102 (discussing
NTP, Inc. v. Research in Motion, Ltd., 418 F.3d 1282, 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2005) and other cases).
48. See Dinwoodie, Trademarksand Territory, supra note 11, at 891-92.
49. See id. at 888 (drawing a distinction between "intrinsic territoriality" and "political"
territoriality and suggesting that doctrines grounded in the former may be more susceptible
to change in light of transborder social and commercial activities).
50. See Dinwoodie, InternationalIntellectualPropertyLitigation,supranote 42, at 435-37
(suggesting that the lack of a private international law of intellectual property law was in part
a function of the 'looming presence of public international intellectual property law" and the
premise of territoriality in particular); see also Dreyfuss, supra note 31, at 839 n.35 (noting
that "in an early presentation of the ALI Principles to the Advisers, a prominent jurist argued
that there was no need for choice of law rules because the territorial principle was so
obviously applicable"). Other causes may have been the overreading of the principle of
national treatment, also a foundational principle of public international intellectual property
law. See Itar-Tass Russian News Agency v. Russian Kurier, Inc., 153 F.3d 82, 89 (2d Cir.
1998); see also William F. Patry, Choiceof Law and InternationalCopyright, 48 AM. J. COMP.
L. 383, 385 (2000) (suggesting lack of attention to choice of law because of the very few cases
involving multistate contacts). Professor Dreyfuss also suggests that the "paucity of global
cases embedded concepts of territoriality so deeply into intellectual property jurisprudence,
it was rarely evident that choices were being made." Dreyfuss, supranote 31, at 839. This last
observation highlights both the significance of private litigation in providing content to rules
and also the potential of territoriality to mask real policy choices.
51. See Nat'l Football League v. TVRadioNow Corp., 53 U.S.P.Q. 2d (BNA) 1831, 1834-35
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the early days of private international law, the necessity was
generated both by trading across borders and not a little military
conquest,5 2 but in recent years the precipitating cause has been free
trade and digital communication technologies. In establishing the
existing private international intellectual property law, we must
also consider the spatial and jurisdictional interpretation of nominally substantive laws.
For example, copyright law is nominally territorial.5 3 Statutorily
endorsed exceptions allowing for extraterritorial enforcement are
narrow.5 4 And explicit engagement with principles of private international law is rare.5 5 But extended regulation has been achieved
by interpreting substantive provisions of the U.S. Copyright Act
(for example, the definition of what constitutes a "copy" or what
constitutes performance) in ways that effectively create choice-oflaw rules. Thus, although early cases held that a "performance," as
(E.D. Pa. 2000); Playboy Enters. v. Chuckleberry Publ'g, Inc., 939 F. Supp. 1032, 1039-40
(S.D.N.Y. 1996); infra notes 100-01,269 & 302 (discussing Joint Recommendation on Internet
Use; NTP, Inc. v. Research in Motion, Ltd., 418 F.3d 1282, 1316-17 (Fed. Cir. 2005); Nat'l
Football League v. Primetime 24 Joint Venture, 211 F.3d 10, 11-12 (2d Cir. 2000)).
52. See JUENGER, supra note 39, at 10-11.
53. Subafilms, Ltd. v. MGM-Pathe Commc'ns Co., 24 F.3d 1088, 1095-98 (9th Cir. 1994)
(en banc).
54. See Quality King Distribs. v. L'Anza Research Int'l, 523 U.S. 135, 145 n.14 (1998).
55. Localization is the classic tool by which courts bring a multistate dispute within the
control of single law. In intellectual property cases, there has been little development of this
particular conflicts device, at least in the sophisticated sense now understood in contemporary
conflicts scholarship. The leading extended judicial discussion of this approach by a U.S. court
is found in Itar-Tass Russian News Agency v. Russian Kurier, Inc. There, on the question of
copyright ownership, the court looked to the policy-based approach of the Second Restatement
and applied the law of the place with the most significant relationship to the parties and the
transaction, giving particular weight to the nationality of the authors and the place of first
publication. Itar-Tass, 153 F.3d at 90-91. The court concluded that the lex loci delicti would
determine infringement, whether as a fixed rule akin to the First Restatement or as part of
a broader interest analysis more similar to the Second Restatement. Id. The flexible policygrounded discussion that is at the heart of Second Restatement analysis would, if fully
developed, be one means by which U.S. courts could further elaborate upon the circumstances
in which it would purport to extrude the application of U.S. law internationally. By definition,
localization effects some extraterritorial regulation by applying a single law to a dispute that
touches more than one nation-state. However, because on infringement questions the court
gave great weight to the lex loci delicti, which was on the facts easy to determine, Itar-Tass
contains no discussion of choice-of-law principles in intellectual property cases that would be
helpful in more challenging cases. Id.; cf. Cranston Print Works Co. v. J. Mason Prods., 49
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1669 (S.D.N.Y. 1999); Shaw v. Rizzoli Intl Pubs., Inc., 51 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1097 (S.D.N.Y. 1999).
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defined in the Copyright Act (for purposes other than choice of law)
occurs at place of receipt of a satellite signal carrying the allegedly
infringing work,5 6 the Second Circuit in NationalFootball League
has since interpreted the same definition as meaning that performance occurs at every "step in the process by which a protected
work wends its way to its audience."5 " As a result, performance of a
work via satellite occurs also at the place of initiation of signal.
Although not explicitly analyzed as such, these interpretations
operate essentially as choice-of-law rules."8 The same type of
analysis is found in cases involving online conduct initiated from
servers abroad.5 9 Likewise, other courts have interpreted the term
"authorize" in the Copyright Act, which was intended to provide an
explicit basis for secondary liability, to provide a discrete basis of
liability with respect to primary conduct occurring abroad. As a
result, this has supplied U.S. courts with the local conduct sufficient
to assume jurisdiction over a transborder dispute."0 Finally, using
equitable trust doctrines, the U.S. courts have used the existence
of a "root copy" or "predicate act" in the United States to assume
jurisdiction over infringing conduct abroad that flows from U.S.

56. See Allarcom Pay TV Ltd. v. Gen. Instrument Corp., 69 F.3d 381, 387 (9th Cir. 1995)
(holding that unauthorized transmission from United States to Canada implicated rights only
under Canadian law).
57. 211 F.3d 10, 12 (2d Cir. 2000).
58. See id.; see also David v. Showtime/The Movie Channel, Inc., 697 F. Supp. 752, 759
(S.D.N.Y. 1988).
59. See Nat'l Football League v. TVRadioNow Corp., 53 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 2d 1831, 1834-35
(E.D. Pa. 2000) (holding that when defendants originated the streaming of copyrighted
programming over the Internet from a website in Canada, public performances occurred in
the United States because users in the United States could access the website and receive and
view the defendants' streaming of the copyrighted material).
60. The courts are split on this question. Compare Subafilms, Ltd. v. MGM-Pathe
Commc'ns Co., 24 F.3d 1088, 1095 (9th Cir. 1994) (en banc) (holding that mere authorization
in the United States of foreign infringing conduct cannot be actionable under U.S. copyright
law because the direct act of infringement abroad was not actionable in the United States),
Fun-Damental Too Ltd. v. Gemmy, 41 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 2d 1427, 1432-33 (S.D.N.Y. 1996)
(following Subafilms), and Armstrong v. Virgin Records, 91 F. Supp. 2d 628, 634 (S.D.N.Y.
2000) (noting repudiation of Peter Starr), with Expediters Int'l, Inc. v. Direct Line Cargo
Mgmt. Servs., Inc., 995 F. Supp. 468, 477 (D.N.J. 1998), and Curb v. MCA Records, Inc. 898
F. Supp. 586, 596 (M.D. Tenn. 1995).
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conduct. 6 Although none of these doctrines is explicitly cast as a
matter of private international law, they clearly operate as such.6 2
C. Core Principles
Three principles of the nascent body of private international
intellectual property are common to most countries, though the
strength of commitment to the principles may vary from one country
to another." All might be thought to be a function of territoriality,
or at least one rather large conception of that principle.

61. See, e.g., L.A. News Serv. v. Reuters T.V. Int'l Ltd., 149 F.3d 987, 990-92 (9th Cir.
1998) (unauthorized transmission and copy of work made in the United States and then
further transmitted to Europe and Africa), later proceedings, LA. News Serv. v. Reuters
Television Intl Ltd., 340 F.3d 926,930 (9th Cir. 2003); Update Art, Inc. v. Modiin Publ'g, Ltd.,
843 F.2d 67, 72-73 (2d Cir. 1988) (unauthorized copy of plaintiff's poster made in the United
States and then further copied and distributed in Israel); Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures
Corp., 106 F.2d 45, 52 (2d Cir. 1939), affl'd, 309 U.S. 390 (1940) (awarding plaintiff profits
from both U.S. and Canadian exhibition of infringing motion picture when a copy of the
motion picture had been made in the United States and then shipped to Canada for
exhibition). Courts applying this theory have not typically analyzed whether the acts abroad
were infringing under the foreign law in question. See, e.g., Sheldon, 106 F.2d at 52. But cf.
Filmvideo Releasing Corp. v. Hastings, 668 F.2d 91, 93-94 (2d Cir. 1981) (declining to enjoin
foreign exhibition absent proof that foreign copyright laws were infringed).
62. See Dreyfuss & Ginsburg, Draft Convention, supra note 29, arts. 11-12 (discussing
some of these doctrines under rubric of private international law).
63. Historically, differences may exist most particularly between common law countries
and countries in the civil law tradition. The approach suggested in this Article draws more
heavily on developments in the common law countries. For example, U.S. courts and scholars
have been more willing to invoke interest analysis to allow substantive policy concerns to
inform conflicts thinking, something that I argue needs further development. See infra text
accompanying notes 67-69. European courts remain more closely tied (via the lex loci
protectionis)to choice-of-law "rules" allocating prescriptive competence according to a fixed
connecting factor, see Rome II, supra note 28, art. 8, despite the development of some conflicts
rules (for example, for contracts involving consumers or employees) that are more sensitive
to substantive policy concerns. Similarly, common law courts have historically made greater
use of comity considerations in deciding transborder disputes, again, something that I regard
as an essential tool going forward. On the other hand, what I regard as problematic
assimilation of adjudicatory and prescriptive jurisdiction, see infraPart II.B.3, has been most
pronounced in common law countries, although recent decisions of the ECJ, see infra text
accompanying notes 151-63, may effectively have inflicted this common law curse on the civil
law countries of Europe. Of course, the problems that require a private international law of
intellectual property manifest themselves in both types of jurisdiction.
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1. Choice of Law: Scope of the Lex Loci Protectionis
Most national courts have applied the lex loci protectionis to
determine the applicable law in intellectual property cases, at least
in adjudicating the question of infringement.6 4 This rule, that the
law of the country for which protection is sought applied in intellectual property cases, is seen as implementation of the principle of
territoriality: "when in Rome, do as the Romans do."6 5 Moreover,
to the (minimal) extent that international treaties expressed a
preference for a choice-of-law rule, the lex loci protectionis was
favored.6"
The lex loci protectionishas been applied with the least debate in
determining the subsistence and infringement of registered
intellectual property rights. The law of the country that granted the
right applies to determine both the validity of the grant and its
scope of protection. There has been somewhat greater controversy
in copyright law, where international law mandates that copyright
exist without compliance with formalities such as registration. Yet,
most commentators would agree that copyright infringement is
typically still a question for the lex loci protectionis.

64. See generallyJaneC. Ginsburg, Groupof Consultantson the PrivateInternationalLaw
Aspects of the Protectionof Works and Objects of Related Rights Transmitted Through Digital
Networks, WIPO Doc. GCPIC/2, at 34-36 (Nov. 30, 1998) (copyright); Graeme B. Dinwoodie,
PrivateInternationalAspects of the Protectionof Trademarks,WIPO Doc. No. WIPO/PIL/01/4,
at 30-31 (Jan. 31, 2001) [hereinafter Dinwoodie, PrivateInternationalAspects] (trademark).
65. On occasion, the choice-of-law principle for infringement is alternatively stated, under
the traditional American approach to choice-of-law in tort cases, as involving the application
of the lex loci delicti. See, e.g., Vanity Fair Mills v. T. Eaton & Co., 234 F.2d 633, 639 (2d Cir.
1956) (noting that "passing off occurs ...
where the deceived customer buys the defendant's
product in the belief that he is buying the plaintiffs"). Indeed, even courts applying more
policy-based theories of choice of law generally have expressed a preference for the lex loci
delicti in determining infringement. See, e.g., Itar-Tass Russian News Agency v. Russian
Kurier, Inc., 153 F.3d 82, 91-92 (2d Cir. 1998). In practice, because acts of copyright and
patent infringement consisted in particular conduct that was reserved to the exclusive
preserve of the copyright or patent owner, this rule typically resulted in the application of the
place of conduct. Trademark law to some extent attributes liability based upon particular
effects and not mere use as such. See Graeme B. Dinwoodie, Lewis & Clark College of Law
Ninth DistinguishedIP Lecture: DevelopingDefenses in Trademark Law, 13 LEWIS & CLARK
L. REV. 99, 127 (2009).
66. See, e.g., Berne Convention, supra note 1, art. 5(2); see also supratext accompanying
notes 17-20 (discussing alternative readings of Article 5(2)).
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Some scholars have, however, questioned the resilience of that
rule in light of the increased international flow of copyrighted works
and the ubiquity of works distributed online.6 7 For these scholars,
the increasingly dispersed and nonexclusive nature of national
prescriptive authority, as well as practical efficiencies, support
revisiting the strength of our unconditional commitment to lex loci
protectionis, even on the question of copyright infringement.6 8 The
lex loci protectionis might fail to capture the complicated set of
affinities that should prescribe the conduct of online actors. And it
might (depending upon how the "place for which protection is
sought" is interpreted) provide little guidance as to applicable law
in online disputes, or instruct the application of the laws of 180
countries to an essentially unitary dispute, or encourage the development of information havens. It is perhaps not surprising,
therefore, that some courts, including in the United States and
Canada, have articulated choice-of-law rules that admit greater
flexibility on the infringement question (without formally jettisoning
respect for the claims of the lex loci protectionis, sometimes
identified in the infringement context as the lex loci delicti).6 9

67. The literature is by no means uniform in its suggested solution, but the problems
identified are common in most of that writing. For a list of illustrative scholarship, see Austin,
Domestic Laws, supra note 19, at 6 n.15; see also Graeme W. Austin, Intellectual Property
Politics and the PrivateInternationalLaw of Copyright Ownership, 30 BROOK J. INT'L L. 899,
899 n.3 (2005) [hereinafter Austin, Intellectual Property Politics] (listing scholarship in
intellectual property law generally).
68. See, e.g., Dinwoodie, A New Copyright Order, supra note 1, at 542-79 (supporting
substantive law method in truly international cases); see also Ginsburg, supra note 64, at 45
(proposing application of the law of the place of server that hosts the allegedly infringing
content, provided that that law is Berne-compliant, absent which, the law of the place of
residence of the website operator applies provided that that law is Berne-compliant, absent
which, the lex fori provided that that law is Berne-compliant). Other scholars have sought to
reaffirm the lex lociprotectionis(provided it is not interpreted as merely the lex fori), but deal
with some of the same objections through reform of jurisdictional doctrines. See, e.g., Austin,
Domestic Laws, supra note 19, at 36-48; Graeme W. Austin, Social Policy Choices and Choice
of Law for Copyright Infringement in Cyberspace, 79 OR. L. REV. 575, 578-84 (2000).
69. See, e.g., Itar-Tass,153 F.3d at 91 (concluding that to determine infringement the lex
loci delicti would apply, whether as a fixed rule or as part of a broader interest analysis); Soc'y
of Composers, Authors & Music Publishers of Can. v. Can. Ass'n of Internet Providers ('Tariff
22"), [2004] 2 S.C.R. 427 (Can.) (noting that "[a] real and substantial connection to Canada
is sufficient to support the application of our Copyright Act to international Internet
transmissions" and that "relevant connecting factors would include the situs of the content
provider, the host server, the intermediaries and the end user").
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Moreover, the scope of application of the lex loci protectionis is
even more uncertain. Certain aspects of an intellectual property
dispute (for example, the validity of a contract relating to the
transfer of intellectual property rights, or the allocation of rights
between employer and employee) implicate interests of states
other than the state where the allegedly infringing conduct occurred

(and "for which," therefore, "protection was sought"). States where
commercial exchanges are made have an interest in determining the
conditions under which those bargains are upheld. The regulation
of the employment relationship affects the social and economic
fabric of the country of production, rather than (or at least as much
as) the country where an act of infringement occurred.70
Thus, although some countries afford the lex loci protectionis a
broad scope of application,71 others have, for example, opted to apply
the lex originis to determine questions relating to the authorship
and ownership of copyright.72 Although U.S. courts have nominally
looked to the policy-based approach of the Second Restatement and
applied the law of the place with the most significant relationship
to the parties and the transaction to questions of initial copyright
ownership,7" they have given weight, in particular, to the nationality
of the authors and the place of first publication.74 As a result, the
United States has effectively adopted a lex originisrule on copyright
authorship.75
70. See Austin, IntellectualPropertyPolitics,supranote 67, at 920-21 (defending attention
to the "important social policy choices reflected in the law of the place where a work was first
created").
71. This includes, for example, Germany, which applies lex loci protectionis even to the
question of the ownership of copyright (an issue on which departure from the principle is quite
common elsewhere). See, e.g., Case No. 12R 176/01, Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Federal Court
of Justice] June 26, 2003 (F.R.G.), reprintedin 35 INT'L REV. INTELL. & COPYRIGHTL. 987,988
(2004); Case No. 1 ZR 88/95, Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Federal Court of Justice] Oct. 2, 1997
(F.R.G.), reprinted in 30 INT'L REV. INDUS. PROP. & COPYRIGHT L. 227, 229-31 (1999).
72. See Paul Torremans, Authorship, Ownership of Rights and Works Created by
Employees: Which Law Applies?, 27 EuR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 220, 220-23 (2005) [hereinafter
Torremans, Authorship] (discussing Belgian law).
73. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 6(2) (1971).
74. See Itar-Tass, 153 F.3d at 89.
75. Cf. Films by Jove, Inc. v. Berov, 154 F. Supp. 2d 432, 448-61 (E.D.N.Y. 2001), motion
for reconsiderationdenied, 250 F. Supp. 2d 156 (E.D.N.Y. 2003), laterproceeding,341 F. Supp.
2d 199 (E.D.N.Y. 2004). On the question of subsistence of copyright (for example, the
standards of originality), the U.S. courts have applied the lex loci protectionis.See Bridgeman
Art Library, Ltd. v. Corel Corp., 25 F. Supp. 2d 421, 425-27 (S.D.N.Y. 1998), affd on
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Such derogations from the lex loci protectionis can clearly be
supported by the different prescriptive interests implicated by rules
regarding the allocation of rights among employers and employees.76
But these alternative choice-of-law rules can also be justified on
other grounds, including the fact that choosing the lex originis to
determine ownership results in the application of a single law to all
disputes.77 This facilitates international exploitation of the work and
tracing of title, which would be largely undisputed as objectives of
substantive efficiency. Finally, Graeme Austin has championed the
law of the place of production, not only because of the different
prescriptive interests implicated by rules on ownership and the
reconsideration,36 F. Supp. 2d 191 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (applying U.S. law).
76. See supra note 19 and accompanying text; see also Michael D. Birnhack, Whose Bratz
Is It? The Integration of Copyright and Employment Law (Sept. 17, 2008) (unpublished
manuscript, on file with author). Of course, it is too simple to say that only the state where
the production took place has a prescriptive interest in the allocation of rights. The discrete
effects of different copyright rules-on subsistence, ownership, transfer, infringement, and
defenses--on the overall objectives of copyright law are, to put it mildly, unclear. Thus, to the
extent that a country seeks to incentivize the production of creative works or enhance access
to creative works (the balance between which is a central point of debate in contemporary
copyright law), it may well be that any number of rules of copyright law might be relevant to
pursuing those objectives. Cf. Austin, Intellectual Property Politics, supra note 67, at 917
(arguing that "[1laws governing ownership do not, for instance, directly determine the
availability or price of materials of culture in different nations.... They might, however,
implicate incentives to create copyright works"). For present purposes, however, we need only
recognize that authorship rules aimed more directly at regulating acts of production implicate
the interests of the country of production more directly than rules aimed at determining what
amounts to infringement in another country. As a result, the country of origin has a relatively
greater claim to have its law apply to determine authorship in foreign litigation than it has
to have its law apply to determine infringement in that same case (assuming it is not also the
loci delicti).
77. See Torremans, Authorship, supra note 72, at 221; see also FAWCETT & TORREMANS,
supra note 4, at 509-10 (emphasizing the importance of "identifying the same author for the
same work in every jurisdiction"); Paul Torremans, The Law Applicable to Copyright: Which
Rights Are Createdand Who Owns Them, 188 REVUE INTERNATIONALE DU DROIT D'AUTEUR
37 (2001) (Fr.). Of course, this goal is only fully ensured if every country adopted the same
choice-of-law rule. Moreover, the single law approach can be disturbed by courts applying
mandatory laws notwithstanding an initial commitment to a single-law-inducing rule such
as lex originis. See Huston v. Socit6 d'Exploitation de la Cinquibme Chaine, Cour de
cassation [Cass. le civ.] May 28, 1991, reprinted in 149 REVUE INTERNATIONALE DU DROIT
D'AUTEUR 197, 197-99 (Fr.) (applying French law to determine that director of motion picture
was an author for purposes of moral rights protection notwithstanding that the United States
was the country of origin). The ALI Principles endorse an approach that is intended to result
in the application of a single law to questions of initial ownership as often as possible. See ALI
PRINCIPLES, supra note 30, 311(2), 312(2), 313.
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benefits of a single law, but also because "sensitivity to the material
circumstances of production in the crafting of conflict of law rules
seems to better accommodate the political concerns that are
grounded in the connection between domestic politics and intellectual property."7 8
Thus, departures from the default rule of lex loci protectionis
already exist. The arguments for those departures are varied, but
include a different balance in the prescriptive interests of sovereign
states, the practical efficiency gains of a single law, and concerns for
political values at play in the international intellectual property
system.
2. Exclusive Jurisdictionand Serial National Litigation
Historically, courts of a particular country (especially common
law countries) would only adjudicate cases involving alleged infringements of rights registered or recognized under the laws of that
country and would dismiss claims asserting violation of foreign
rights.7 9 The doctrinal devices through which this philosophy of
"exclusive jurisdiction" was implemented varied among countries,
but the result was the same.' National courts assumed jurisdiction
only over alleged infringement of intellectual property rights conferred by their local law, and thus provided protection only against
conduct occurring in that country.
To obtain relief in more than one country for acts of intellectual
property infringement, a plaintiff was required to sue separately in
every country in which infringement was alleged to have occurred,
notwithstanding that the allegations might involve the same conduct by the same defendant with respect to what in fact was the
same piece of intellectual property.8 1 De iure, by virtue of the
78. Austin, Intellectual PropertyPolitics,supra note 67, at 921-22.
79. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED

STATES § 415, cmt. i. (1986) ("Patents are considered territorial, having legal effect only in the
territory of the issuing state. Accordingly, the United States has no jurisdiction to apply its
law to validate or invalidate a foreign patent, regardless of the origin of the invention, or the
nationality, residence, or principal place of business of the holder of the patent or of any
licensee.").
80. See generally Graeme W. Austin, The Infringement of Foreign Intellectual Property
Rights, 113 LAW Q. REV. 321 (1997).
81. This jurisdictional approach also had the effect of assimilating the lex lociprotectionis
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principle of territoriality, paradoxically installed by international
treaty, the rightholder's separate national proceedings each sought
to vindicate separate national property rights.82 This result, which
might seem to flow most logically in the case of registered rights
that come into being only upon separate application to different
national authorities, pertains equally as a matter of law to rights
(for example, copyright) that accrue without registration. 3 There
may be international intellectual property law, but there is no such
thing as an international copyright, patent, or trademark.
The reasons for this approach, why there has been some modification of the rule in recent years, and why I suggest a further departure, are more fully outlined below.
3. Independence of Rights
The principle of independence of rights formally enshrined in the
Paris and Berne Conventions' bears more of the characteristics of
a rule of public international law, but has clear effects in private
litigation and is seen as another instantiation of the principle of
territoriality. Yet, as we will see below, in certain contexts, the
legal principle cannot withstand commercial realities in an interconnected world. I seek to raise the question whether a direct
commercially grounded intrusion upon that principle is more
destructive of international comity than minor, relatively deferential accommodations (for example, assumptions that patents on the
to the lex fori. Indeed, that result could also be reached through one reading of international
treaties. See supra note 19.
82. Nor does the national treatment obligation found in treaties mandate any different
approach. See Bonzel v. Pfizer, Inc., 439 F.3d 1358, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (upholding forum
non conveniens dismissal of patent action and noting that "[t]hese treaties require a nation's
courts to give equal treatment to nationals of other nations; they do not establish jurisdiction
or require a nation's courts to receive litigation that it reasonably believes would be better
conducted in another nation").
83. See Computer Assocs. Int'l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 126 F.3d 365, 367-68 (2d Cir. 1997)
(discussing separate French and U.S. copyrights implicated by proceedings in France and the
United States).
84. See Paris Convention, supra note 1, art. 4bis(1) (patents), art. 6(3) (trademarks); see
also 15 U.S.C. § 1126(f) (2006) (trademarks); Berne Convention, supranote 1, art. 5(2) (stating
that enjoyment and exercise of rights granted authors of copyrighted works shall be
independent of the existence of protection in the country of origin and extent of protection
shall be governed by the law of the country where protection is claimed).
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same invention, emanating from a common application, are presumptively the same in two separate countries) that might be made
under a progressive international intellectual property litigation
85
system.
D. Recent Illustrations
These principles have been put under pressure, at least in the
first place, not by withering scholarly critique or the force of sustained international reform efforts. Rather, social and commercial
pressures have generated disputes among private parties that by
their very nature call into question the wisdom or resilience of these
principles. To illustrate those disputes, consider the following six
transborder litigation scenarios drawn from case law over the past
decade. These illustrations can be used as test cases for application
of the approaches discussed in Part II of this Article and the
challenges that globalization causes for intellectual property law.
But they also reinforce what conflicts scholars have long known:
territoriality does not foreclose the effective development of a
private international law. In fact, the principle of territoriality
compels a private international law of intellectual property.
1. NTP v. Research in Motion
In litigation that attracted substantial public attention because
of its significance for the continued availability of the BlackBerry
personal data assistant, a U.S. patentee brought an infringement
action against Research in Motion (RIM), the Canadian manufacturer of the BlackBerry device."6 RIM's most compelling argument
was that the acts alleged to infringe NTP's patents did not occur
"within the United States" as required by the language of the U.S.
patent statute.8 7 Some of the necessary elements of the RIM
85. See infra text accompanying notes 329-30.
86. NTP, Inc. v. Research in Motion, Ltd., 418 F.3d 1282 (Fed. Cir. 2005), replacing392
F.3d 1336 (2004). The litigation settled before trial. See Richard Waters & Chris Nuttal,
BlackBerry Deal Ends Threat to the Service, FIN. TIMES, Mar. 4, 2006, at 13.
87. See Rotec Indus., Inc. v. Mitsubishi Corp., 215 F.3d 1246, 1251-52 (Fed. Cir. 2000)
(requiring that in order to violate the patent holder's exclusive right to offer its patented
invention for sale, the allegedly infringing offer must occur within the United States); Johns
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BlackBerry service (in particular the "relay" or router that transfers
the email from the BlackBerry server to the local network allowing
the BlackBerry user to receive the email) occurred in Canada. This
relay was a key feature of the NTP patent; it was an essential
element in the claim of the NTP patent that RIM was alleged to
have infringed. NTP possessed no equivalent patent in Canada
where the essential activity occurred.8" In its initial opinion, a panel
of the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit held that, because
"control and beneficial use" of the infringing system was within the
United States, the statutory language was satisfied and upheld the
finding of infringement.8 9
Patent law is resolutely territorial,9 ° and the Supreme Court has
consistently reaffirmed that principle,9 1 albeit subject to later
targeted congressional derogations92 (sometimes in implementation
of treaty obligations).93 Thus, the apparent ease with which the
court found infringement of U.S. law came as a surprise to many
commentators. As a result, the Canadian government filed an
amicus brief supporting a request for rehearing en banc, urging
restraint and comity on the part of the U.S. courts and suggesting
that the court's opinion interfered with the business and legal
environment in Canada.94
Hopkins Univ. v. CellPro, Inc., 152 F.3d 1342, 1365-66 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (holding that mere
possession of a patented product does not constitute infringement until the product is used,
sold, or offered for sale in the United States).
88. This is based on a search of the global QPAT database as of Mar. 2, 2006.
89. NTP, Inc. v. Research in Motion, Ltd., 392 F.3d 1336, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2004), opinion
withdrawn and replaced by 418 F.3d 1282 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
90. In the United States, patent rights are the most explicitly territorial of the primary
forms of intellectual property. See Donald S. Chisum, Normative and Empirical Territoriality
in Intellectual Property:Lessons from PatentLaw, 37 VA. J. IN'L L. 603, 605 (1997); see also
35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2006) ("[W]hoever without authority makes, uses, offers to sell, or sells any
patented invention, within the United States or imports into the United States any patented
invention during the term of the patent therefor, infringes the patent.") (emphasis added).
91. See Deepsouth Packing Co. v. Laitram Corp., 406 U.S. 518, 525-27 (1972).
92. See, e.g., 35 U.S.C. § 271(f) (2006); Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T, 550 U.S. 437, 437 (2007).
93. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 12, art. 28 (delineating minimum rights of the
patentee, and including right to "import" the patented invention).
94. See Brief Amicus Curiae of the Government of Canada in Support of the Request for
Rehearing En Banc Made in the Combined Petition by Research in Motion, Ltd. for Panel
Rehearing and Rehearing En Banc, NTP, Inc. v. Research in Motion, Ltd., 2005 U.S. App.
LEXIS 23112 (Oct. 7, 2005) (03-1615), available at http://patentlaw.typepad.com/
patent/files/CAGovBr.pdf [hereinafter Brief for Amicus Curiae]. Amicus briefs were also filed
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The Court of Appeals decided to withdraw its original opinion. In
its revised opinion, the court concluded that the situating of the
router in Canada enabled RIM to avoid infringement of NTP's
method claim because "a process cannot be used 'within' the United
States as required by section 271(a) unless each of the steps is
performed within this country." 95 However, the court affirmed that,
with respect to the system claim, the use of a patent occurs at "the
place at which the system as a whole is put into service, i.e., the
place where control of the system is exercised and beneficial use of
the system obtained."96 Thus, RIM remained liable for infringement
of NTP's system claims because "RIM's customers located within
the United States controlled the transmission of the originated
information and also benefited from such an exchange of information. 97
After the issuance of the panel's revised opinion, RIM and the
Government of Canada (unsuccessfully) sought en banc rehearing.9 8
The Canadian government argued that transnational enforcement
of patents may be appropriate in certain circumstances, but that
this should only occur after a full analysis of the international
implications of applying U.S. law to activity happening abroad
(which the Canadian government did not discern in the panel's
opinion). More particularly, the Canadian government argued that:
by the Canadian Chamber of Commerce and the Information Technology Association of
Canada, likewise urging restraint.
95. NTP, Inc. v. Research in Motion, Ltd., 418 F.3d 1282, 1318 (Fed. Cir. 2005). If all
countries adopted the same rule with respect to method claims, there would be no applicable
law in divided infringement claims. See generally Mark Lemley et al., Divided Infringement
Claims, 33 AIPLA Q.J. 255 (2005).
96. NTP, 418 F.3d at 1317. Intriguingly, the patents at issue were reexamined by the U.S.
Patent Office, suggesting that the administrative arm of the U.S. government may have been
influenced as much, if not more, by the amicus brief of the Canadian government (although
the solution of invalidating the patents is hardly a direct response to the arguments of the
Canadian government). Indeed, public disclosures have since indicated that there had been
communications about the patent between the two administrative offices.
97. Id.
98. The NTP rule regarding control and beneficial use is not all that far removed from the
conclusion reached by the English courts in Menashe Business MercantileLtd. v. William Hill
OrganizationLtd., [2002] EWCA Civ. 1702 (U.K.). There, the situating abroad of a server that
played a part in implementing the patented system (a system for online gambling) did not
prevent the court from finding infringement concluding that by using their computers in the
United Kingdom, William Hill's customers "will in substance use the [overseas] host computer
in the United Kingdom." Id. 34.
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The reissued panel opinion lacks any acknowledgment or discussion of the effect of, or the effect upon, long-established international understandings and agreements regarding national
jurisdiction over intellectual property. Because the decision of
the panel was neither explained nor justified in terms of
contemporary, internationally-accepted principles of national
jurisdiction, the opinion raises questions concerning fundamental principles upon which this international intellectual property
system has harmoniously been based for well over a century. 9

The position of the Canadian government accurately captures the
essence of three important propositions: (1) it may well be that, in

an interconnected world, national courts will on occasion be
required to grant transborder relief; (2) this should only occur after
a full airing of the principles of private internationallaw that inform that question;" 0 and (3) the court of appeals had effectively
99. Brief for Amicus Curiae, supra note 94, at 3.
100. Thus, as suggested above, even without explicit rules of private international law,
choice-of-law rules are effectively developing notwithstanding the continuing commitment to
territoriality. Patent law starts from a nominally territorial point: infringement depends upon
conduct within the United States, effectively instituting a choice-of-law rule that the place of
making, selling, or using an invention applies to determine whether that manufacture, sale,
or use amounts to infringement. NTP complicated this picture. Thus, method claims in a U.S.
patent will be infringed only if all elements of the claim are practiced in the United States.
In contrast, with system claims, the applicable law is the country where there is "control and
beneficial use" of the infringing system. This reading functions as a localization rule where
activity occurs cross-border. The rules in NTP are not, however, framed as choice-of-law rules.
Because of the principle of exclusive jurisdiction, the court formally held that as a matter of
substantive patent law the U.S. patent would only be infringed in certain defined
circumstances. The holding thus takes the form of a rule regarding what amounts to
infringement. But if the Federal Circuit had adopted a more liberal view of jurisdiction in
Voda, see infra Part I.D.4, a court faced with the NTP dispute might have asked several
questions more commonly found in classical private international law analysis. For example,
one might have asked whether RIM was an opportunistic Canadian company. See
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 6 (1971); cf. ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 30,
§ 204 (extended jurisdiction provisions). Or, in assessing the level of state interests, one might
have explored whether there was in Canada any conflicting rights determination, whether
there had been no determination in Canada, whetherparallelrights existed, etc. Cf. Offshore
Rental Co. v. Cont'l Oil Co., 583 P.2d 721, 726-27 (Cal. 1978) (noting relevance of intensity of
interest and whether the policy interest is archaic or progressive); Joint Recommendation on
Internet Use, infra note 269. In determining the relevant questions to ask, the court might
also have taken into account that Congress, in § 271(f) and (g) has adopted narrow augmentations of U.S. rights that allow the U.S. patentee to restrain certain activities abroad. See
Timothy R. Holbrook, TerritorialityWaning? PatentInfringement for Offering in the United
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announced a rule of private international law by localizing the use
in the United States under what is a version of the law of the most
significant relationship test.1"'
The Canadian government's position, as articulated both in its
briefs before the court and in the state interests reflected in its law
and nongrant of rights to NTP, required respect for several reasons.
First, in a world of shared, nonexclusive prescriptive authority, the
legitimacy of U.S. law applied without regard for the interests of
other states is diminished notwithstanding substantial U.S. activity,
and Canada had a rightful prescriptive interest in the dispute.
Second, for practical reasons of enforcement, to the extent that the
decisions of the U.S. courts might require recognition in Canada to
be effective, the legitimacy-grounded assertions of the government
of Canada can have real practical bite. Private international law has
always been concerned with practical questions as well as claims of
fairness and legitimacy. 11 2 Even if the U.S. courts concluded that
U.S. law's finding of infringement should prevail over the lack of
plaintiff's rights in Canada because of the weight of the respective
interests of those two countries, the mere recognition and consideration of the international implications would surely render Canadian cooperation more likely and show the respect toward the
decisions of other nations that other doctrines such as exclusive
jurisdiction (discussed below) purport to further.

States To Sell an Invention Abroad, 37 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 701, 720-23 (2004); see also NTP,
418 F.3d at 1313-24 (interpreting § 271 extraterritoriality provisions); Bayer AG v. Housey
Pharms., Inc., 340 F.3d 1367, 1371-78 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
101. U.S. courts in copyright cases have gravitated to that same test (as have Canadian
courts). See Itar-Tass Russian News Agency v. Russian Kurier, Inc., 153 F.3d 82, 90 (2d Cir.
1998); Soc'y of Composers, Authors & Music Publishers of Can. v. Can. Ass'n of Internet
Providers ('Tariff 22"), [2004] 2 S.C.R. 427 (Can.). Sometimes though, as with the NTP court
in patent law, that consideration may simply have informed what the court frames as an
interpretation of substantive copyright law. See Nat'l Football League v. Primetime 24 Joint
Venture, 211 F.3d 10, 13 (2d Cir. 2000); Nat'l Football League v. TVRadioNow Corp., 53
U.S.P.Q. 2d (BNA) 1831, 1834-35 (W.D. Pa. 2000); cf. Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Chuckleberry
Publ'g, Inc., 939 F. Supp. 1032, 1039 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (trademark).
102. See Vanity Fair Mills v. T. Eaton & Co., 234 F.2d 633, 639 (2d Cir. 1956); see also
Graeme B. Dinwoodie, Remarks, 30 BROOK. J. IN'L L. 885, 887 (2005) [hereinafter Dinwoodie,
Remarks] (noting comments of Graeme Austin).
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2. Boosey & Hawkes Music Publishers,Ltd. v. Walt Disney Co.
In 1940, Disney released the animated motion picture Fantasia.10 '
The soundtrack to the film included a performance of The Rite of
Spring by Igor Stravinsky. 10 4 Because under U.S. law the musical
work was in the public domain, Disney needed no authorization to
record or distribute it in the United States, but permission was
required for distribution in countries where Stravinsky still enjoyed
copyright protection. In 1939, the parties executed an agreement
giving Disney rights to use the work in a motion picture.' 5
In 1991, Disney released Fantasiain video cassette and laser
disc format and distributed the video on a worldwide basis (including throughout the United States).' 6 Boosey & Hawkes Music
Publishers Ltd., the assignee of Stravinsky's copyright for The
Rite of Spring, sued Disney in federal district court in New York,
contending that the 1939 license did not authorize distribution in
video format. 0 7 Boosey sought damages for copyright infringement
deriving from Disney's sales of videocassettes of Fantasiain at least
eighteen foreign countries. 0 8
The district court held that video distribution was not covered by
the license and granted partial summary judgment to Boosey, but
dismissed the complaint under the doctrine of forum non conveniens
insofar as it sought relief for foreign copyright claims, concluding
that these claims should be tried in each of the nations whose
copyright laws were invoked.0 9 The district court's decision was
wholly consistent with the conventional approach to transborder
copyright claims in the U.S. courts. The principle of exclusive jurisdiction had, with only minor judicial exceptions and some scholarly
objection,"10 been followed in copyright litigation.

103. Boosey & Hawkes Music Publishers, Ltd. v. Walt Disney Co., 145 F.3d 481, 484 (2d
Cir. 1998).
104. Id. at 484-85.
105. Id. at 484.
106. Id. at 485.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. See, e.g., London Film Prods. Ltd. v. Intercontinental Commc'ns, Inc., 580 F. Supp. 47,
48-50 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
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Although the Second Circuit vacated the summary judgment in
Boosey's favor on whether the license covered video distribution, the
court reversed the order dismissing the foreign copyright claims on
forum non conveniens grounds and remanded to the district court
for trial."1 The Second Circuit criticized the district court for failing
to consider whether there were alternative fora capable of adjudicating Boosey's copyright claims, as is generally required prior to
making a forum non conveniens dismissal.1 12 For example, the lower
court made no determination whether Disney was subject to jurisdiction in the various countries where the court anticipated that
trial would occur, and did not condition dismissal on Disney's
consent to jurisdiction in those nations. In a footnote, the Second
Circuit noted that it need not decide whether forum non conveniens
dismissal requires the dismissing court to ascertain a single
alternative court with jurisdiction over the claims." 3
The court of appeals also rejected the district court's analysis of
the so-called public interest factors that are part of forum non
conveniens analysis." 4 The district court had reasoned that the trial
would require extensive application of foreign copyright (and
antitrust) jurisprudence, bodies of law involving strong national
interests best litigated in their respective countries, and that these
necessary inquiries into foreign law would place "an undue burden
on our judicial system.""' 5 The Second Circuit stressed that "while
reluctance to apply foreign law is a valid factor favoring dismissal
,standing alone it does not justify dismissal" and noted that:
Numerous countervailing considerations suggest that New York
venue is proper: defendant is a U.S. corporation, the 1939
agreement was substantially negotiated and signed in New
York, and the agreement is governed by New York law. The
plaintiff has chosen New York and the trial is ready to proceed
here. Everything before us suggests that trial would be more

111. Boosey & Hawkes Music Publishers,145 F.3d at 491-92.
112. Id. at 491.
113. See id. at 491 n.8; cf. ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 30, §§ 222(1)(f), 222(4)(b) (noting
that the extent of the ability of the court to hear all claims is a factor to consider in
determining whether and where to consolidate transborder litigation).
114. See Boosey & Hawkes Music Publishers,145 F.3d at 492.
115. See id.
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"easy, expeditious and inexpensive" in the district court than
dispersed to 18 foreign nations.1 '

As a result of the Second Circuit's decision, the parties reached a
global settlement. 117 It is not uncommon that resolution of the
private international law questions raised by multiterritorial
intellectual property disputes proves sufficient to encourage the
parties to reach a private settlement of all the separate national
claims." 8 Indeed, although this departure from exclusive jurisdiction has since been followed by other U.S. courts in copyright
cases," 9120those cases have typically settled prior to trial of the foreign
claims.
The approach in Boosey & Hawkes has also been followed in
copyright cases in the European Union, although the precipitating
cause in Europe was the Brussels Convention on Jurisdiction and
Recognition of Judgments, which governs the resolution of disputes
in civil and commercial matters between persons domiciled in the
parties to the Convention (essentially, countries of the European
Union). For example, although English courts have typically not
entertained claims under foreign copyright laws,'12 in 1999, the
Court of Appeal permitted a claim for copyright infringement based
upon conduct in Holland to proceed in the English courts.' 2 2 The
116. See id.
117. See Boosey & Hawkes Settle with Disney, TELEGRAPH, Mar. 21, 2001, available at
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/fnance/4478676/Boosey-and-Hawkes-settle-with-Disney.html.
118. See infra Part I.D.5 (discussing Microsoft v. Lindows); see also Sterling Drug Inc. v.
Bayer, 14 F.3d 733, 737-38 (2d Cir. 1994).
119. See, e.g., Carrell v. Shubert Org. Inc., 104 F. Supp. 2d 236, 257 (S.D.N.Y. 2000)
(permitting claims based on foreign copyright laws to proceed notwithstanding the plaintiffs
failure to specify in her complaint the particular countries under whose laws the claims were
made); Armstrong v. Virgin Records, 91 F. Supp. 2d 628,637-38 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (entertaining
claims based on unspecified foreign copyright laws on the basis of diversity jurisdiction and
pendent jurisdiction); see also Frink Am., Inc., v. Champion Road Mach., Ltd., 961 F. Supp.
398, 404 (N.D.N.Y. 1997) (declining to dismiss claim under Canadian copyright law).
120. The question of efficiencies that are secured by consolidation is complex. See
Dinwoodie, The Role of InternationalNorms, supra note 11, at 200; Dinwoodie, Trademarks
and Territory, supra note 11, at 937 n.209.
121. See Griggs Group Ltd. v. Evans, [2005] Ch. 153 (High Ct. 2004), later proceeding,
[2005] F.S.R. 31 (C.A. 2005) (U.K.) (discussing this history); see, e.g., Tyburn Prods. Ltd. v.
Conan Doyle, [1990] 1 All E.R. 909 (Ch.) (U.K.) (rejecting plaintiffs request to declare that the
defendant had no rights under U.S. copyright and trademark laws). See generally Austin,
IntellectualPropertyPolitics,supranote 67 (explaining English and commonwealth case law).
122. See Pearce v. Ove Arup P'ship, [2000] Ch. 403 (C.A. 1999) (Eng.).
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court acknowledged that because the acts of copying in that case
(the unauthorized construction of a building conforming to the
architectural work contained in the plaintiffs plans) took place in
Holland, they could not constitute infringements of the plaintiffs
U.K. copyright. The court concluded that rules of U.K. law that
previously restricted the adjudication of foreign intellectual property
claims had been overridden by the Brussels Convention (and other
legislative developments) when the parties were from contracting
states, and that the case for infringement of Dutch copyright could
therefore proceed.'23 Doctrinally, the U.K. defendant could clearly
be sued in the United Kingdom because the place of the defendant's
domicile is the starting point for determining jurisdiction under the
convention.1 24 The court accepted that the English courts had
jurisdiction in relation to the claims against the non-U.K. defendants under article 6(1) of the Brussels Convention, which provides
that a person domiciled in a contracting state may be sued when he
is one of a number of defendants in the courts of the place where
any one of them is domiciled.
3. EU-Wide Relief- Roche v. Primus and GAT v. LUK
The same jurisdictional provisions of the Brussels Convention
that prompted the shift in Pearce,now translated into the form of an
EU Regulation (the Brussels I Regulation),'2 5 provided the basis for
some time for several national courts within the European Union to
123. The Pearce court noted that it was not
necessary to decide whether ... an action for alleged infringement of a foreign
copyright by acts done outside the United Kingdom in a state not party to the
Brussels Convention, in a case where no question as to the validity or
registration of the right was in issue, was ... justiciable in an English court.
Id. at 439. But see Griggs Group v. Evans, [2004] EWHC 1088 (Ch.), [2005] Ch. 153, later
proceeding, [2005] EWCA Civ. 11(U.K.).
124. See Brussels Convention, supra note 26, art. 2; see also id. art. 5(3) (establishing
jurisdiction in tort cases at place of conduct or effects of tort).
125. The Brussels Convention was incorporated directly into EU law with the adoption of
the Brussels Regulation. See Brussels I, supra note 26. The Regulation took account of the
entry into force of the Amsterdam Treaty and the inclusion of judicial cooperation in civil
matters within the Community framework. See Ronald A. Brand, The EuropeanUnion's New
Role in InternationalPrivateLitigation, 2 LOy. U. Cm. INT LL. REv. 277,282 (2005). Denmark
did not take part in the adoption of the Regulation, which is thus not binding upon Denmark
and is not applicable to it. But since July 1, 2007 the Regulation has effectively been extended
to Denmark by an agreement between the EU and Denmark.
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offer pan-European relief to patentees holding a series of national
patents emanating from the same European Patent Convention
(EPC) application. The Dutch courts in particular were willing to
grant such relief, especially on a preliminary basis, relying heavily
on the related defendants provision of Article 6(1). The "relatedness"
required to invoke Article 6 had been the subject of elaboration by
the European Court of Justice,"' and the Dutch courts had acted on
the premise that the common source of an EPC application satisfied
that test.
However, Article 16(4) of the Brussels Convention (now Article
22(4) of the Brussels Regulation) expressly provided for exclusive
jurisdiction over certain aspects of litigation concerning patent (and
other registered intellectual property) rights. In particular, "in
proceedings concerned with the registration or validity of patents"
(or other registered industrial property rights), exclusive jurisdiction vested in the courts of the state of registration. The Dutch
courts interpreted this set of provisions as still permitting the
exercise of cross-border jurisdiction with respect to claims of
infringement, as opposed to challenges to validity, and there is clear
language in the travaux prparatoiresof the Brussels Convention
that supported that distinction.'2 7
This argument encountered resistance from other national courts
within the European Union. The U.K. courts in particular adopted
a more expansive interpretation of the effects of exclusive jurisdiction, pointing out that questions of validity and infringement are in
many (if not most) patent cases inevitably intertwined.'2 8 As a
126. See Case 189/87, Kalfelis v. Bankhaus Schr6der, 1988 E.C.R. 5565 (requiring that the
connection must be of "such a kind that it is expedient to determine those actions together in
order to avoid the risk of irreconcilable judgments resulting from separate proceedings.").
Article 6(1) of Brussels I which succeeded the Brussels Convention, codified this gloss.
Brussels I, supra note 26, art. 6(1).
127. Dir. in the Belgian Ministry of Foreign Affairs & External Trade, Report on the
Convention on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial
Matters, delivered to the Comm. of PermanentReps. of the Member States, 1979 O.J. (C 59) 1,
13-42 [hereinafter Jenard Report].
128. See Fort Dodge Animal Health v. Akzo Nobel, [1998] F.S.R. 222, 243-44 (C.A. 1997)
(Eng.) ("Where questions of infringement and validity both arise it is invariably not possible
to conclude there is infringement without validity being determined. An extreme example,
known as a Gillette defence, is where the alleged infringer's case is that the patent is invalid
if the alleged infringing acts fall within the ambit of the claims.... It follows that the split
contemplated in the Jenard Report between actions for infringement and proceedings
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result, to ensure exclusive jurisdiction as regards validity in the
courts of the registering state, other national courts would also be
required to defer to that court with respect to infringement questions (if validity was raised, an assertion by a defendant that thus
became a jurisdictional tool).' 29
The manner and context in which the counterarguments of the
U.K. courts were advanced are important because they highlight
some of the ways in which a new private international intellectual
property law might be developed, as well as some of the competing
judicial efficiency considerations that will inform that development.
First, in one of the most significant cross-border cases, Fort Dodge
Animal Health v. AKZO Nobel, the U.K. courts were afforded the
opportunity to express their views (at least their official views,
through the vehicles of issued opinions) 3 ° not simply by being
presented with similar requests for cross-border relief that they
treated differently. This was not a battle of two wholly separate,
competing lines of national case law. Rather, when litigants in
Dutch proceedings sought cross-border relief from the Dutch courts
with respect to claims that encompassed alleged infringement of
U.K. patents, the defendants in those cases challenged the validity
of the U.K. patents in question (in the U.K. courts) and sought
antisuit injunctions from the U.K. courts prohibiting the plaintiffs
from proceeding in the Netherlands.13 1 Although the satellite
concerned with validity cannot always be made."); see also Coin Controls Ltd. v. Suzo Int'l
(U.K.) Ltd., [1999] Ch. 33 (Eng.); Ian Karet, IntellectualProperty Litigation--Jurisdictionin
Europe, 3 INTELL. PROP. Q. 317, 319-27 (1998); Ian Karet, Suit, Anti-Suit: Cross-Border
Skirmishing in Fort Dodge v. Akzo, 19 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 76, 76-81 (1998) (discussing
Fort Dodge and Coin Controls).
129. Litigants engaged in much jurisdictional skirmishing beyond this summary. See
Phillipe de Jong, The Belgian Torpedo: From Self-Propelled Armament to Jaded Sandwich,
27 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 75, 75 (2005) (noting recent developments); Vincenzo Jandoli, The
"ItalianTorpedo," 31 INT'L REV. INDuS. PROP. & COPYRIGHT L. 783, 788 (2000) (discussing
preemptive actions for declarations of noninfringement).
130. National patent judges involved in these cases were active participants at the time in
a number ofinternational intellectual property conferences where these topics were discussed.
Although those judges were scrupulous in not offering their views on cases before them, it
would be naive to think that discussions that occurred in such venues did not also help the
judges to obtain an even firmer grasp on the common approach that had to be adopted.
131. The tactic is of course not unknown when parallel national proceedings are initiated,
but at least in cases in which one court is purporting only to decide claims under its own law,
the principle of territoriality is likely to dissuade other courts from issuing such injunctions.
See, e.g., Computer Assocs. Int'l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 126 F.3d 365, 371-72 (2d Cir. 1997)
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litigation proved fruitful in the long-term and may represent the
type of dialogue through which new international norms are
constructed, it suggests a cost that it is more likely to be incurred
with the onset of consolidated national proceedings and must be
figured into the calculation of efficiency gains that are claimed for
consolidation.
Second, although the U.K. courts disagreed with the initial
approach that was adopted by the Dutch courts, the U.K. courts
denied the antisuit injunctions requested. For example, the Fort
Dodge court concluded that although U.K. courts are
entitled to prevent persons domiciled in this country from being
submitted to vexatious or oppressive litigation whether started
or to be started in this country or another country.... [S]ince such
an order indirectly affects the foreign court, the jurisdiction
must be exercised with caution and only if the ends of justice so
require. We emphasise that injunctions granted for such purposes are directed against32the vexatious party and not the courts
of the other jurisdiction. 1

The U.K. court referred the question of the interpretation of the
Brussels Convention to the European Court of Justice, but declined
even to grant interim relief to the defendants. The court expressed
every confidence that the Dutch court will, when deciding
what to do, take into account that this Court will be referring
to the European Court of Justice questions [regarding the
Convention].... It will give proper weight to our conclusion that
it would be wrong for this Court to anticipate the decision of the
European Court. It will, we believe, also consider carefully the
other views expressed in this judgment and, of course, the
133
submissions of the parties and the facts.

(copyright); Microsoft Corp. v. Lindows.com, Inc., 319 F. Supp. 2d 1219, 1221-23 (W.D. Wash.
2004) (trademark); Universal Music Austl. Pty Ltd. v. Sharman License Holdings Ltd. (2004)
FCA 183 (Austl.). See generally Peter Nicolas, Comment, The Use of Preclusion Doctrine,
Antisuit Injunctions, and Forum Non Conveniens Dismissals in TransnationalIntellectual
Property Litigation, 40 VA. J. INTL L. 331 (1999).

132. See FortDodge, [1998] F.S.R. at 246.
133. See id. at 247.
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In opinions in separate cases handed down not long after the U.K.
courts respectfully advanced their contrary view, and in advance of
any guidance from the European Court of Justice, the Dutch courts
sua sponte accepted the British arguments regarding the broader
effect of the exclusive jurisdiction provision as persuasive. 13 4 Courts
in transborder disputes are often assumed to be quite nationalistic,
but they may adopt less nationalistic postures when the choices
before them are expressly presented as implicating international
policy dilemmas.
Third, although the matter was referred to the European Court
in FortDodge, the case settled long before any judgment was issued
by the Court. The convergence of Dutch and U.K. jurisprudence
occurred without intervention of a supervisory court and without
any order being issued by one national court that 13
indirectly
usurped
5
the jurisdiction of the courts of another country.
Indeed, during consideration of the scope of exclusive jurisdiction
after the U.K. courts had expressed their opinion, the Dutch
courts further restricted the availability of pan-EU relief by interpreting the requirement of relatedness of claims more strictly. The
European Court had previously put a gloss on the language of
Article 6(1), such that the connection between the cases must have
been of "such a kind that it is expedient to determine the actions
together in order to avoid the risk of irreconcilable judgments
resulting from separate proceedings."1 3 The Court of Appeal in the
Hague rejected the argument that sufficient connection may be
grounded on nothing more than the alleged infringement of national
137
patents derived from a common European patent application.
134. See Expandable Grafts P'ship v. Boston Scientific BV, [1999] F.S.R. 352, 356-57 (C.A.
1999) (Neth.). The Dutch courts did suggest some differences from the UK approach, including
a requirement that the cancellation in the state of registration be a plausible case, and left
open the possibility of staying, rather than dismissing, the local action while the parties
pursued the validity question in the state of registration. See id. This latter option has been
taken up by the Swiss Commercial Court in Eurojobs in the wake of GAT. See Paul L.C.
Torremans, The Way Forwardfor Cross-BorderIntellectualPropertyRights: Why GAT Cannot
Be the Answer, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 191, 202-03
(Stefan Leible & Ansgar Ohly eds., 2009) (discussing Eurojobs, in which the Swiss court

required prompt action by the parties in the state of registration).
135. Thus, although the Brussels Convention contemplates a role for a supervisory court,
this particular accommodation occurred through dialogue between national courts themselves.
136. Case 189/87, Kalfelis v. Bankhaus Schr6der, 1988 E.C.R. 5565, 1.
137. See Expandable GraftsP'ship, [1999] F.S.R. at 353. Most of the leading cases involved

748

WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 51:711

Instead, the Dutch courts held that the jurisdiction provided by
Article 6(1) could be exercised in patent cases only "[wihere several
companies belonging to one group of companies are selling identical
products in different national markets."'3 8 Moreover, notwithstanding that cross-border (or "international") jurisdiction could be
exercised in such circumstances, predictability and avoidance of
forum shopping required that the plaintiff not have an unlimited
choice of suing in the courts for the domicile of any one of the
companies belonging to the group."3 9 Instead, the consolidated
actions could only be brought in their entirety in "the courts for the
domicile of the head office in question which is in charge of the
business operations in question and/or from which the business plan
originated" because "[t]he relation between the actions and these
courts will be the closest."' 4 °
This required the court to identify what it called "the spider 14in1
the web," and suit could be brought in the domicile of that entity.
As a result, although the Dutch court accommodated the U.K.
approach to exclusive jurisdiction within its case law, it also took
the opportunity to develop a principle of jurisdictional preference
regarding the consolidation of related national patent claims that
is not in haec verbis in the Brussels Convention. Instead, the Dutch
court grounded the rule in the essential principles of private
international law that informed the Brussels Convention.
Yet, even this restrained liberalization proved too creative for the
European Court of Justice, notwithstanding the grand objectives
underlying the Brussels Convention and its subsequent endorsement in the Brussels Regulation. In Roche v. Primus, the Court of
Justice held that the Dutch "spider in the web" doctrine was
inconsistent with the Brussels Convention. 4 1 In Roche, American
patent rights (typically national patent rights stemming from a common European patent),
although some cases involved trademark claims. See, e.g., Yakult v. Danone, [1998] E.T.M.R.
465, 472, 479 (Hague Dist. Ct. 1998) (observing that "[tihe system under the Brussels
Convention requires that the court, even the 'own' court referred to in Article 2, must apply
foreign trade mark law in the appropriate cases" but declining to extend the injunction to
France although "competent to do so" because of a lack of urgency).
138. Expandable GraftsP'Ship, [1999] F.S.R. at 359.
139. Id. at 353.
140. Id. at 359.
141. Id. at 360.
142. Case C-539/03, Roche Nederland BV v. Primus, 2006 E.C.R. 1-6535.
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plaintiffs sought to consolidate patent infringement claims based
upon ten national patents flowing from a common European patent,
and did so in the Netherlands, where the principal defendant (Roche
Nederland) was based. 14' The plaintiffs relied on Article 6(1) to
assert jurisdiction over claims against the eight non-Dutch defendants (all part of the Roche group) for infringement of the nonDutch patents. 4 4 The Dutch court asked the European Court for
clarification on whether the necessary relatedness (measured by
the risk of irreconcilable judgments) could be established by the
presence of a common European patent from which the alleged
infringements flowed, especially ifthe defendants formed part of one
and the same group of companies, acted together on the basis of a
common policy, or committed allegedly infringing acts that were the
same or virtually the same. 145
The court concluded that such a risk did not arise even when the
related defendant companies were alleged to have infringed counterpart European patents because the national patents emanating
from European patent applications were legally independent. 4 6 As
a result, divergent decisions in two of those states would not be
irreconcilable. 4 7 Indeed, even if the factual context was identical-that is, if the related companies acted in an identical or similar
manner with regard to the same invention in accordance with a
common policy elaborated by them-the legal context for each claim
was different because of the formal independence of national
148
patents.
Moreover, the court expressed concern that despite the gains of
procedural economy that liberal consolidation would appear to offer,
a contrary conclusion would undermine legal certainty by holding
open the possibility of multiple heads of jurisdiction.14 9 Thus, the
143. Id. 31.
144. Id. 35.
145. Id. 1 42.
146. Id. 144; see also supra Part I.C.3 (discussing independence of rights).
147. Roche Nederland,2006 E.C.R. at 109.
148. Id.
122. This formalistic analysis is complicated further by the protocol governing
Article 69 of the EPC. See Annette Kur, A Farewell to Cross-BorderInjunctions? The ECJ
Decisions GAT v. LuK and Roche Nederland v. Primus and Goldenberg, 37 INT'L REV. INTELL.
PROP. & COMPETITION L. 844, 849 (2006).
149. The court also made note of the costs of satellite litigation that might be required to
establish the necessary connection. See Roche Nederland,2006 E.C.R. at 138.
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court raised the specter of forum shopping that a liberal interpretation might offer, notwithstanding that the Brussels Convention
already offered alternative bases of jurisdiction in intellectual
property cases. Finally, the Court suggested that the question of
consolidation could not be considered without regard to the exclusive jurisdiction provision, which could in any event cause a partial
fragmentation of the patent proceedings if the validity of the patent
was raised. 5 °
This last point was made all the more real because of another
decision handed down by the court on the same day-GAT v. LuK.'5 '
In GAT, a dispute between two German companies regarding alleged infringement of a French patent, the alleged infringer sought
a declaration of noninfringement, which included an attack on the
validity of the French patent. 52 The action was brought in a
German court, which concluded that it had jurisdiction to hear the
action relating to the alleged infringement of the French patent,
including the plea as to the alleged nullity of those patents. 53 The
German court regarded the exclusive jurisdiction provision in
its decision would not operate erga
Article 16(4) inoperative because
54
omnes but only interpartes.
When that interpretation of Article 16(4) was referred to the
court, the court afforded that provision much more expansive
scope. 1 55 The court's broader reading was grounded not in the
language of the provision (which said little to resolve the question),
but in the purposes of exclusive jurisdiction. 5 6 The court suggested

150. Id. 133.
151. Case C-4/03, GAT v. LuK, 2006 E.C.R. 1-6509.
152. Id. 3.
153. Id. 4. In fact, the Landgericht dismissed the action brought by GAT, holding that the
patents at issue satisfied the requirements of patentability.
154. Id.
8-13. In the context of exclusive jurisdiction, those arguing for liberal
jurisdiction rules seek to emphasize the formal legal (interpartes) effects of the decision of a
court other than the state of registration, as opposed to the broader commercial realities that
might flow from a decision finding the patent invalid. In the context of party consolidation,
those same advocates of a liberal reading of Brussels I would likely emphasize the realities
of inconsistent judgments despite formal independence of national patents (thus supporting
consolidation). The same inconsistency occurs on the other side of the debate.
155. Some of the opinion is taken up with addressing inconsistencies in the different
language versions of the Brussels Convention. Ultimately, these differences did not affect the
court's decision. See id. 19.
156. Id. 22.
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that Article 16(4) was designed to ensure that jurisdiction rests with
courts of the state of registration because those courts were "closely
linked to the proceedings in fact and law," and "are best placed to
adjudicate upon cases in which the dispute itself concerns the
validity of the patent ...
[because they would be] applying their own

national law, on the validity and effects of the patents which have
been issued in that State.'' 7
Of course, this argument of convenience and judicial competence
proves too much; it would suggest never litigating a case in a forum
other than the state in which the dispute arose and whose law was
applicable. Yet, many principles of private international law operate
on a rejection of that proposition. Thus, the court buttressed the
elevation of the state of registration in patent cases by noting that
the issuance of patents necessitates the involvement of the national
administrative authorities, and that:
[t]his [generalized] concern for the sound administration of
justice becomes all the more important in the field of patents
since, given the specialised nature of this area, a number of
Contracting States have set up a system of specific judicial
protection, to ensure that these types of cases are dealt with by
specialised courts.'58

Moreover, the court reasoned that the reverence with which the
Convention treats exclusive jurisdiction is emphasized by the
inability of parties to derogate from it by consent and the obligation
of any other state to declare of its own motion that it has no jurisdiction because of Article 16(4)."'1 That reverence suggested to the
court that it must be vigilant against any effort to circumvent its
application. Finally, the court stressed that circumventing Article
16(4) would, like a broad reading of Article 6(1), risk increased
forum shopping and exacerbate the risk of conflicting decisions
between the state adjudicating infringement and the state of
registration. 0 Of course, the latter risk might be ameliorated by
giving merely inter partes effects to the decision of the state other
157.
158.
159.
160.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

21-22.
22.
24.
28-29.
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than the state of registration (as the German court had done). But
the court would not countenance that option because, it asserted,
"[t]he effects flowing from such a decision are in fact determined by
national law [and] [i]n several Contracting States, ... a decision to
annul a patent has erga omnes effect."'' Moreover, that approach
would "lead to distortions, thereby undermining the equality and
uniformity of rights and obligations arising from the Convention for
the Contracting States and the persons concerned."' 62
The court's judgment in these two cases suggests that even the
adoption of an apparently liberal convention on private international law, operated by national courts in a common economic area
and superintended by a superior court, has been unable to undo
some of the historical commitments to exclusive jurisdiction that a
fixation with territoriality has wrought.163
4. Voda v. Cordis Corp.
Dr. Jan Voda was a cardiologist in Oklahoma City who held U.S.
and foreign patents on a number of catheters and other medical
devices used in the practice of medicine.'6 4 He discovered that a
Florida company, Cordis, was infringing his patents by manufacturing and selling infringing catheters in a number of countries.'6 5
Initially, Voda filed a patent infringement claim in federal district
court in Oklahoma, alleging only that the defendant had infringed
his three U.S. patents. 6 6 Later, in order to reduce litigation costs
and to obtain a uniform judgment, Voda filed a motion to amend his
complaint to add claims of infringement of five counterpart foreign
patents (from Europe and Canada), all of which emanated from a
common Patent Cooperation Treaty (PCT) application, and thus
161. Id. 30.
162. Id.
163. The GAT court did recognize that:
[i]f...
the dispute does not concern the validity of the patent ... and these matters
are not disputed by the parties, the dispute will not be covered by Art[icle] 16(4)
of the Convention ...
for example, with an infringement action, in which the
question of the validity of the patent allegedly infringed is not called into
question.
Id. 16.
164. Voda v. Cordis Corp., 476 F.3d 887, 890 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
165. Id. at 891.
166. Id. at 890-91.
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consolidate the worldwide patent issues into a single case. 167 The
district court granted Voda's request to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the claims of infringement of the foreign patents. 6 '
Consistent with the approach of foreign courts discussed above,
U.S. courts have historically been reluctant to adjudicate foreign
patent infringement claims.'6 9 One of the issues argued before the
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit was the extent to which the
court's jurisprudence endorsed a per se prohibition against exercising jurisdiction over foreign patent infringement claims, or
whether the court simply had not yet been presented with a case
that satisfied the standard for supplemental jurisdiction. 7 0 More
fundamentally, the court was asked whether the principles of
territoriality and independence of rights should preclude U.S. courts
from exercising such jurisdiction because foreign infringement
claims cannot, by virtue of these two principles, form part of the
same "case or controversy" because they do not share a "common
171
nucleus of operative fact" with the U.S. infringement claim.
In 2007, the court handed down its judgment. 172 In a 2-1 decision,
over a powerful dissent, the majority held that the district court
abused its discretion in granting the plaintiff leave to amend his
complaint. 17' As a narrow matter, the majority opinion turned on a
reading of the supplemental jurisdiction statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1367,174
167. The plaintiff sought to add claims under his European (British, French, and German)
and Canadian patents. Id. at 891.
168. See Voda v. Cordis Corp., No. 03-1512, 2004 WL 3392022, at *1 (W.D. Okla. Aug. 2,
2004), rev'd, 476 F.3d 887 (Fed. Cir. 2007). While the appeal of the jurisdictional question was
pending, the district court tried the U.S. patent infringement before a jury and Voda
prevailed. Voda v. Cordis Corp., 506 F. Supp. 2d 868, 875 (W.D. Okla. 2007).
169. See Mars, Inc. v. Kabushiki-Kaisha Nippon Conlux, 24 F.3d 1368, 1373-75 (Fed. Cir.
1994) (holding that a U.S. district court lacked jurisdiction to entertain claims of infringement
of a Japanese patent).
170. Voda, 476 F.3d at 893.
171. Id. at 894-96.
172. See id. at 887.
173. Id. at 904-05.
174. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a) (2006) ("[Inn any civil action of which the district courts have
original jurisdiction, the district courts shall have supplemental jurisdiction over all other
claims that are so related to claims in the action within such original jurisdiction that they
form part of the same case or controversy under Article III of the United States
Constitution."); City ofChi. v. Int'l Coll. of Surgeons, 522 U.S. 156, 164-65 (1997) (interpreting
§ 1367 as codification of principles of pendent and ancillary jurisdiction, and of the standard
that the claims "derive from a common nucleus of operative fact,' such that 'the relationship
between [the federal] claim and the state claim permits the conclusion that the entire action
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particularly the part of that provision outlining grounds on which
courts may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction. 17 The
majority held that it was an abuse of discretion for the district court
to permit the filing of the amended complaint because considerations of "comity, judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and other
exceptional circumstances constitute compelling reasons to decline
jurisdiction under [section] 1367(c).', 176 Because the majority concluded that the district court had abused its discretion under
§ 1367(c), it found it "prudent" not to determine whether the foreign
and domestic claims derived from a common nucleus of operative
were within the scope of the
fact in the first place such that they
77
supplemental jurisdiction statute. 1
The Mars opinion, in which the Federal Circuit previously had
considered whether U.S. courts had jurisdiction over foreign patent
infringement claims, had analyzed the question under § 1367(a),
namely whether the foreign and domestic claims "derive from a
common nucleus of operative fact. ' 178 There, the court identified four
factors that cut against jurisdiction: the respective patents were
different, the alleged acts were
different, the accused devices were
i
before the court comprises but one constitutional 'case"' (quoting United Mine Workers of Am.
v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725 (1966))).
175. Voda, 476 F.3d at 897-98; see 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c) (2006) (providing that "district courts
may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction ... if (1) the claim raises a novel or complex
issue of State law, (2) the claim substantially predominates over the claim or claims over
which the district court has original jurisdiction, (3) the district court has dismissed all claims
over which it has original jurisdiction, or (4) in exceptional circumstances, there are other
compelling reasons for declining jurisdiction").
176. Voda, 476 F.3d at 898.
177. Id. at 896. The majority also refrained from deciding whether the United Mine
Workers "case or controversy" test imposes a second, separate hurdle to satisfy in order to
establish supplemental jurisdiction under § 1367(a). United Mine Workers contains language
regarding whether the claims would "ordinarily be expected [to be tried] in one judicial
proceeding." 383 U.S. at 725. The majority did not firmly claim that this was part of the test
for supplemental jurisdiction, imposing a second hurdle to overcome, rather than a variable
to inform the "common nucleus" inquiry. Voda, 476 F.3d at 896-97. The Supreme Court itself
has been somewhat opaque in addressing this question. If autonomous weight was given to
this consideration, it would likely preclude the exercise of supplemental jurisdiction because
it would tie contemporary jurisdiction to current and past notions of jurisdiction. There is, of
course, no reason to do so; indeed, there are affirmative reasons to discard whatever shackles
were voluntarily assumed by the federal judiciary. See Pro Swing, Inc. v. ELTA Golf Inc.,
[2006] S.C.R. 52 (Can.).
178. Mars, Inc. v. Kabushiki-Kaisha Nippon Conlux, 24 F.3d 1368, 1374-75 (Fed. Cir.
1994).
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different, and the governing laws were different." 9 These are surely
important considerations, the weight of which will vary from case to
case and, perhaps more importantly, will vary over time in light
inter alia of substantive patent harmonization, increased international exploitation of patents, and changes to the structure of
national patent adjudication.' But the majority never fully tackled
the extent to which these considerations might merit different
weight fifteen years after Mars or elaborated on these factors.
The Voda majority acknowledged that the commonalities in the
case before it were greater than in Mars,'' but dismissed the
significance of that fact because the district court judge had failed
to articulate in any depth why he thought the case closer to Ortman
(a pre-Federal Circuit case in which the Seventh Circuit had denied
a motion to dismiss a foreign patent claim) 8 2 than Mars. 8 ' The
majority faulted the district court for not taking discovery, or
making findings, on the Mars factors, while at the same time noting
that Mars neither supplanted the "common nucleus of operative
fact" test nor provided an exhaustive list of factors that courts can
consider."8 Yet, although the majority correctly noted the incompetence of an appellate court to determine such matters, it failed to
offer any guidance to lower courts on what additional considerations
might be relevant." 5
Although the majority noted in passing that "[t]he district court
correctly observed that Mars did not establish a per se rule preventing U.S. courts from asserting supplemental jurisdiction to adjudicate foreign patents,"'8 6 the opinion never directly and definitively
addressed some of the central arguments surrounding the exclusive
jurisdiction question. 7 But the majority's view on the question can
179. Id.
180. The significance of these changes is discussed below. See infra text accompanying
notes 242-43 (discussing multinational acquisition mechanisms).
181. See Voda, 476 F.3d at 895.
182. Ortman v. Stanray, 371 F.2d 154, 158 (7th Cir. 1967).
183. Voda, 476 F.3d at 895-96.
184. Id. at 895.
185. Id.; see ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 30, § 212.
186. Voda, 476 F.3d at 895.
187. The Federal Circuit did not address whether a federal court could assume jurisdiction
over the subject matter of a foreign patent infringement claim based upon diversity of
citizenship, see 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (2006), because Voda did not plead diversity. See Fairchild
Semiconductor Corp. v. Third Dimension, 589 F. Supp. 2d 84,91-94, 100 (D. Me. 2008) (taking
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clearly be discerned from its discussion of the considerations that
informed its conclusion under § 1367(c) and its inconclusive exploration of § 1367(a).18 Several variables prominently drive the
majority's skepticism about such jurisdiction: a conviction that the
issues in counterpart foreign and U.S. patent infringement claims
are "not the same"; an over-reading of the principle of independence
of rights as an internationally-mandated constraint on adjudication
of foreign claims; a legitimate concern for intruding on the interests
of foreign governments that fails to situate the application of foreign
law within the broader picture of current transborder patent
disputes in the U.S. or foreign courts; and blanket assertions about
judicial economy and party convenience that too easily rely on the
supposed complexity of national patent law to undermine the
benefits of consolidated litigation that are accepted in numerous
aspects of our court system. 8 9
jurisdiction on this basis); Baker-Bauman v. Walker, No. 3:06 CV017, 2007 WL 1026436, at
*1-2 (S.D. Ohio Mar. 27, 2007) (same). When U.S. federal courts first assumed jurisdiction
over foreign copyright claims, they based their authority on diversity jurisdiction. See Boosey
& Hawkes Music Publishers, Ltd. v. Walt Disney Co., 145 F.3d 481 (2d Cir. 1998); London
Film Prods. Ltd. v. Intercontinental Commc'ns, Inc., 580 F. Supp. 47, 48 (S.D.N.Y. 1984). If
courts were to assert authority over actions for infringement of foreign patents on this basis,
then any discretion to decline jurisdiction would rest on the doctrine of forum non conveniens,
rather than the (somewhat similar) provisions of§ 1367(c). See Creative Tech., Ltd. v. Aztech
Sys., Ltd., 61 F.3d 696, 699-701 (9th Cir. 1995). As a result, this might install an approach
closer to that advocated in this Article, turning attention to the reasons why a court might
decline to exercise its jurisdiction. See infra text accompanying notes 307-15. Intriguingly, it
is also possible that any appeal of the exercise of jurisdiction might be heard not by the
Federal Circuit, but by the relevant regional circuit. The jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit is tied to the assertion of claims "arising under the [patent laws of the
United States]." Of course, the Voda majority (and implicitly Judge Newman) regarded this
issue as raising a "question unique to U.S. patent law," and thus applied Federal Circuit case
law rather than the law of the regional circuit from which the appeal was taken. See Voda,
476 F.3d at 892; see also Mars, Inc. v. Kabashiki-Kaisha Nippon Conlux, 24 F.3d 1368, 1371
(Fed. Cir. 1994) ("The issue whether the district court had jurisdiction to hear Mars' claim of
Japanese patent infringement 'is of importance to the development of the patent law and is
clearly a matter that falls within the exclusive subject matter responsibility of this court."').
Moreover, one should not simply be able to circumvent the uniformity goals behind the
creation of the Federal Circuit simply by pleading diversity jurisdiction. But perhaps the goals
of uniform interpretation of U.S. patent law are not at issue when merely foreign patents are
at stake and no federal question could have been presented (that is, if no U.S. patent were
involved). Moreover, the Supreme Court has recently reined in the scope of Federal Circuit
jurisdiction, even when the issue involved U.S. patent law. See Holmes Group, Inc. v. Vornado
Air Circulation Sys., Inc, 535 U.S. 826, 829-34 (2002).
188. Voda, 476 F.3d at 893-98.
189. Id. at 893-904.
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First, the majority on a couple of occasions suggested that the
lack of identity in "issues" between the U.S. and foreign claims was
of relevance to the question before the court. 9 ° Yet, as the majority
barely acknowledged, judicial discussion of the strict identity of
issues in related intellectual property litigation has occurred primarily with respect to questions of antisuit injunctions, not jurisdiction.' This is a significant distinction. Antisuit rules prevent
the relitigation of rights; thus, a strict insistence on identity is
necessary to keep antisuit injunctions exceptional in nature. In
contrast, rules of jurisdiction enable the assertion of rights in the
first place and need not be so strictly read. Consolidation of related
claims under supplemental jurisdiction has never depended on
absolute identity of issues; similarity of the background to the
claims should be sufficient.
Second, the majority asserted that the United States would be
undermining the principle of independence of rights enshrined in a
number of patent treaties to which it is a party by allowing a district
court to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over foreign patent
claims.'9 2 Indeed, in a remarkable misreading of international law,
the majority several times asserted that those agreements do not
allow U.S. courts to hear foreign claims.' 93 This is simply wrong.'
To be sure, no patent treaty requires courts in one country to
adjudicate foreign infringement claims. But gaps in international
instruments are reservations to the national autonomy of signatory
states. Indeed, were it otherwise, members of the Paris Union and

190. Id. at 894.
191. See Stein Assocs., Inc. v. Heat & Control, Inc., 748 F.2d 653, 658 (Fed. Cir. 1984)
(denying motion for antisuit injunction enjoining a party from enforcing a foreign patent
before a foreign tribunal because "the issues are not the same, one action involving United
States patents and the other involving British patents" and that "[o]nly a British court,
applying British law, can determine validity and infringement of British patents"); see also
Computer Assocs. Intl, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 126 F.3d 365, 371-72 (2d Cir. 1997).
192. Voda, 476 F.3d at 898-903. It is not clear that the different treaties listed by the
majority as "the law of the land" are in fact self-executing in the United States. See In re Rath,
402 F.3d 1207 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
193. See Voda, 476 F.3d at 898-99 ("Nothing in the Paris Convention contemplates nor
allows one jurisdiction to adjudicate the patents of another, and as such, our courts should not
determine the validity and infringement of foreign patents.").
194. See Fort Dodge Animal Health v. AKZO Nobel, [1998] F.S.R. 222, 242 (C.A. 1997)
(Eng.) (noting that neither TRIPS nor the Paris Convention is concerned with jurisdiction and
believing this point acte claire such that no reference was required to the ECJ).
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the World Trade Organization that did permit such jurisdiction
would be in violation of their obligations under international law.
Third, the majority's more general invocation of "comity" to
support its position is no more persuasive. The opinion quoted the
Supreme Court's explanation that:
"Comity," in the legal sense, is neither a matter of absolute
obligation, on the one hand, nor of mere courtesy and good will,
upon the other. But it is the recognition which one nation allows
within its territory to the legislative, executive or judicial acts of
another nation, having due regard both to internationalduty
and convenience, and to the rights of its own citizens or of other
persons who are under the protection of its laws. 9 '
The majority misconstrued the notion of "international duty,"
arguing that "Voda has not identified any international duty,... that
would require our judicial system to adjudicate foreign patent
infringement claims."' 96 Comity might loom large if an international
duty precluded the assertion of jurisdiction, but the absence of any
international obligation to hear foreign cases does not speak to
whether it offends comity to go further than international treaty
commitments require. As argued more fully below, it may be the
highest possible display of support for another sovereign to facilitate
respect and enforcement of its patent rights against a U.S. defendant.'
Finally, the majority exhibited a remarkably static view of the
role of courts in facilitating efficient resolution of disputes, apparently wanting a negotiated multilateral treaty as a precondition
to adjectival innovation.' Judge Newman, in contrast, was willing
to recognize the changes in international patent exploitation
that make such innovation possible within existing rules.'9 9 The
195. Soci6t6 Nationale Industrielle A6rospatiale v. U.S. Dist. Court, 482 U.S. 522, 543-44
n.27 (1987) (quoting Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 163-64 (1895)) (emphasis added).
196. Voda, 476 F.3d at 901.
197. Cf. London Film Prods. Ltd. v. Intercontinental Commc'ns, Inc., 580 F. Supp. 47,49-50
(S.D.N.Y. 1984).
198. Voda, 476 F.3d at 899-900.
199. Although I am sympathetic to Judge Newman's dissent, it is probably an
overstatement to say that the decision of the majority not to accept jurisdiction over the
foreign patent claims was at odds with prior case law. See id. at 916-17 (Newman, J.,
dissenting).
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backwards-looking mindset of the majority is perhaps best exemplified by the majority's invocation of the local action doctrine in
support of its position. The local action doctrine had long been used
by British and commonwealth courts to limit jurisdiction over
foreign intellectual property claims," 0 but even some U.K. courts
(hardly the torch carriers on this issue) have jettisoned that doctrine
in light of international harmonization of intellectual property.2 ' As
the Canadian Supreme Court recognized recently, the historical
rules of private international law applicable to intellectual property
need to be revised to take account of contemporary realities.0 2
In many respects, the disagreement between the majority and the
dissent stems from a different stance on a couple of core propositions: one relates to the role of domestic courts in transborder cases
generally, and the other relates to the place of patent law in the
private international scheme. As to the role of domestic courts, the
majority acknowledged that the supplemental jurisdiction statute
authorizes courts to hear foreign law claims, but suggested that this
would occur in "certain limited circumstances."2 3 In contrast, Judge
Newman starts from the proposition that courts "appl[y] the law of
other sovereigns all the time" and that the rules surrounding federal
jurisdiction over supplemental state claims were irrelevant to the
question before the Court.20 4 On the place of patent, the majority
relies on patent exceptionalism to support its position: patent laws
are highly complex, foreign countries have specialized courts, and
the adoption of the same approach by other countries would
interfere with the uniformity goal underlying the creation of the
Federal Circuit. 0 5 Yet, as Judge Newman pointed out, recent indications from the Supreme Court suggest some skepticism about
patent exceptionalism. 20 6 Moreover, as discussed below, the international network of judges that has arisen out of the creation of

200. See Austin, Intellectual PropertyPolitics, supranote 67, at 918-19.
201. See Griggs Group Ltd. v. Evans [2004] EWHC 1088 (Ch.), (2005) Ch.D. 153, later
proceeding, [2005] EWCA Civ. 11 (U.K.).
202. Cf. Pro Swing Inc. v. ELTA Golf Inc., [2006] S.C.R. 52 (Can.).
203. Voda, 476 F.3d at 894.
204. Id. at 906 (Newman, J., dissenting) (citing Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 907
(1997)).
205. Id. at 902-03 (majority opinion).
206. Id. at 910 (Newman, J., dissenting).
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specialized courts ameliorates the concerns of judicial competence
that lie behind patent exceptionalism. °7
Despite the regressive character of the majority opinion, it does
suggest one important lesson as courts seek to develop a private
international law of intellectual property. The core holding of the
majority was that the district court had abused its discretion, in
large part because it failed to explain (and the majority assumed,
therefore, failed to consider) the reasons for exercising its discretion
in favor of jurisdiction."' As Judge Newman explained in her
dissent, this is a somewhat harsh evaluation of the lower court
given that it purported to rely on the initial grant of jurisdiction
under § 1367(a) and did not tackle the discretionary declination of
jurisdiction under § 1367(c).2 °9 Yet, the lack of a reasoned opinion
obviously influenced the majority, which at several parts of its
opinion referenced the "three-page order" of the district court, or
its summary analysis.210 Although Judge Newman persuasively
explained why the district court should not have been compelled to
spell out analysis in which it was not required to engage, the
importance of judicial dialogue to the development of principles of
private international intellectual property law suggests that the
lower court should have seized the opportunity to explain the
considerations that warranted the exercise of jurisdiction in this
case."' Simply asserting that the case looked "more akin to Ortman
than to Mars"contributes little to the lawmaking process, even if (as
Judge Newman argued) it was perfectly adequate as a matter of
U.S. adjectival law.2" 2
5. Microsoft v. Lindows
Microsoft filed a complaint in federal court in Seattle alleging
that Lindows' use of the term LINDOWS (for an open source Linux
operating system with an interface that resembles Windows
software) was an infringement of its trademark in the term
207.
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.

See infra note 337 and accompanying text.
Voda, 476 F.3d at 904-05.
Id. at 909-10 (Newman, J., dissenting).
Id. at 891 (majority opinion).
Id. at 910 (Newman, J., dissenting).
Id. at 895-96 (majority opinion).
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WINDOWS for operating systems.21 3 The defendant argued, inter
alia, that the term WINDOWS was generic, and the district court
judge had indicated an initial receptivity to that argument.2 14
Having failed to obtain appellate review of the analysis on the
question of generic status, and while the U.S. trial was pending,
Microsoft initiated or threatened litigation against Lindows and
its distributors in several other countries.2 15 Consistent with the
position of the British courts discussed above, the U.S. court declined to issue an antisuit injunction against Microsoft's foreign
litigation.2 16
Microsoft duly obtained preliminary injunctions in the
Netherlands, Finland, and Sweden, before settling the Dutch
case.2" 7 Initially, Lindows tried to maintain some use of the
LINDOWS mark (at least as part of its corporate name) in the
United States, but eventually in July 2004, Microsoft settled its
trademark suits against Lindows on a global basis with a $20
million payment to Lindows, which agreed to change its name to
LINSPIRE. 21 8' The inefficiencies of marketing a product, especially
one heavily distributed online, under a different mark in different
countries were not worth the marginal benefits of being able to use
the more communicative mark LINDOWS.
As a result of the successful actions in Europe, and despite the
possibility of an adverse decision in the United States, a single
result was reached globally. The attack on U.S. rights, nominally
independent of the separate European trademark registrations,
was effectively rebuffed as a result of the foreign determinations.
Microsoft officials stressed the legal principle of independence of

213. Microsoft Corp. v. Lindows.com, Inc., No. C01-2115C, 2002 WL 31499324, at *1 (W.D.
Wash. Mar. 15, 2002).
214. Id. at *8-12. The judge had issued no final ruling on whether WINDOWS was generic,
but his decision on the date in respect of which that determination had to be made signaled
the likely outcome.
215. Microsoft Corp. v. Lindows.com, Inc., 319 F. Supp. 2d 1219, 1221 (W.D. Wash. 2004).
216. See id. at 1221-23.
217. Id. at 1221.
218. Lindows and Microsoft Settle Suit, N.Y. TIMES, July 20, 2004, at Cll.
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rights,21 9 but Lindows understood that that principle was meaning22
less in a global market. 1
6. Sarl Louis Feraudv. Viewfinder
The third principal subject of private international law is the
recognition and enforcement of judgments. There is little developed
case law on this topic in the intellectual property field, in part
because the primary relief in intellectual property cases typically
takes the form of injunctive relief, often preliminary injunctive
relief.22 ' Such orders are rarely capable of direct recognition and
enforcement.22 2 Indeed, the limits of enforcing injunctive orders
abroad may explain some of the motivation behind the decision of
the U.S. Congress to include jurisdiction in rem against domain
names as part of the Anti-Cybersquatting Consumer Protection Act

in

1999.223

The paucity of decisions on enforcement may also reflect the fact
that the United States has tended to enforce foreign judgments
notwithstanding that the full faith and credit obligations imposed
by the U.S. Constitution and federal legislation on state and federal
courts do not extend to foreign judgments. 224 Although other
countries, including countries within the European Union, are not
so accommodating, foreign litigants frequently have sufficient
assets in the United States such that foreign enforcement is not
219. Microsoft officials defended their international strategy by noting that"Microsoft must
protect its trademarks or risk losing them and that a ruling in the U.S. case would unlikely
affect overseas trademarks. 'The resolution of the U.S. case doesn't necessarily bind any other
country."' Microsoft-Lindows Battle Expands in Europe, CNET NEWS, Dec. 8, 2003,
http://news.cnet.comlMicrosoft-Lindows-battle-expands-in-Europe/2100-7344_3-5116840.html.
220. Lindows officials saw the new lawsuits differently, charging that "[iut's a tactic to
make us spend money opening up all these new legal fronts.... It makes no sense to launch all
these lawsuits when in three months, this case will be decided in a U.S. court and, if we lose,
we'll change our name, and it's a nonissue." Id.
221. For a recent indication by the Canadian Supreme Court that internationalization of
the exploitation of intellectual property requires reconsideration of traditional principles of
recognition of judgments, see Pro Swing Inc. v. ELTA Golf Inc., [2006] S.C.R. 52 (Can.); see
also Disney Enters. Inc. v. Click Enters. Inc., 49 C.P.R. (4th) 87 (Ont. 2006) (Can.).
222. See Richard L. Garnett, Trademarks and the Internet: Resolution of InternationalIP
Disputes by UnilateralApplication of U.S. Laws, 30 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 925, 937 (2005).
223. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(2) (2006).
224. See Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 163-64 (1895); see also Dreyfuss, supranote 31, at
822 (discussing enforcement practices).
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necessary.22 The decision of the district court (and, to a lesser
extent, the appeals court) in Feraud v. Viewfinder thus represented
the most extended judicial discussion in recent years of the
enforceability of a foreign intellectual property judgment.22 6
In Feraud, the French plaintiffs, who designed high-fashion
clothing, had obtained a default judgment for one million francs
from a French court against a Delaware corporation that maintained websites on which it posted photographs from fashion shows
and other information about fashion events.22 v The defendant had
posted photographs of models wearing clothing of the plaintiffs
design at various fashion shows in Paris, and the complaint filed in
France alleged that this violated both French copyright and unfair
competition law.22
When the plaintiffs sought to enforce their judgment in New
York, the defendant argued that, under the New York recognition
statute, the French judgment should not be enforced because the
damages awarded bore no relation to actual damage sustained,
because the underlying French law was inconsistent with U.S.
intellectual property law, and because enforcement of the judgment
would be inconsistent with the First Amendment.2 2 9
As with most states, the New York recognition statute (applied by
federal courts sitting in New York and exercising diversity jurisdiction) calls for the enforcement of foreign money judgments unless
to do so would be "repugnant to the public policy" of the state.2 3 °
Neither the amount of damages awarded, nor the differences
between French and U.S. copyright law, satisfied this strict standard.2 3' The damage award was issued after the defendant's failure
to contest the amount in France, and the notion of an award not
wholly reflecting actual damages is also found in U.S. copyright law
and trademark law.232 And enforcement analysis does not require a
plaintiff to show that the actions in France would have violated
American law; rather, the question is whether "the judgment of the
225.
226.
227.
228.
229.
230.
231.
232.

See Dreyfuss, supra note 31, at 822.
See Sarl Louis Feraud Int'l v. Viewfinder, 489 F.3d 474 (2d Cir. 2007).
Id. at 476-77.
Id.
Id. at 477-78.
Id. at 479-80.
Id. at 482-84.
See 15 U.S.C. § 1117 (2006); 17 U.S.C. § 412 (2006).
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French court imposing liability under French law is repugnant to
the public policy of the State of New York" (and the French law did
not approach that standard).23 3 The district court reasoned that:
Copyright and trademark law are not matters of strong moral
principle. Intellectual property regimes are economic legislation
based on policy decisions that assign rights based on assessments of what legal rules will produce the greatest economic
good for society as a whole. Different countries will, at different
times, reach different conclusions as to the types of creative
endeavor that should receive the benefit of copyright protection
and the extent of that benefit, and different conclusions as to the
kinds of competitive activity that should be encouraged or
discouraged by trademark law. If the United States has not seen
fit to permit fashion designs to be copyrighted, that does not
mean that a foreign judgment based on a contrary policy
decision is somehow "repugnant to the public policies underlying
'
the Copyright Act and trademark law."234
This is a strong endorsement of the principle of national autonomy in public international intellectual property law. However, the
court concluded that because the defendant's activities fell "within
the purview of the First Amendment," to enforce a judgment based
upon liability for engaging in those activities would violate the
public policy of New York.235 In reading the provisions of the statute
to preclude the enforcement of a foreign judgment that attached
liability to conduct abroad that would have been protected by the
First Amendment in the United States, the court was acting in line
with several other U.S. courts (in nonintellectual property cases).2 36
However, intellectual property judgments (especially copyright and
trademark judgments) will frequently implicate speech-like values.
233. Feraud,406 F. Supp. 2d at 281.
234. Id.
235. Id. at 282.
236. See Yahoo!, Inc. v. La Ligue Contre le Racisme et l'Antisemitisme, 169 F. Supp. 2d
1181 (N.D. Cal. 2001), rev'd on other grounds, 379 F.3d 1120 (9th Cir. 2004), rev'd en banc,
433 F.3d 1199 (9th Cir. 2006) (refusing to enforce French order that was inconsistent with
First Amendment values); Telnikoff v. Matusevitch, 702 A.2d 230, 244 (Md. 1997) (rejecting
enforcement of English libel judgment); Bachchan v. India Abroad Publ'ns Inc., 585 N.Y.S.2d
661 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1992) (refusing to enforce English libel judgment that had no regard to
First Amendment libel doctrine).
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Such an approach to recognition, especially when activities forming
the basis for the judgment occurred wholly or substantially abroad,
would offer a potentially large exception to enforcement in cases in
which the laws of the rendering and enforcing court are different.2 37
Yet, that is precisely when enforcement obligations are of vital
importance.2 38 Without taking issue with the principles espoused by
the lower court, the Second Circuit vacated the district court opinion
because of the failure of the lower court to make a full analysis of
whether French law provided protections comparable to those
offered by the First Amendment and remanded to the lower court to

do so. 239

II. REFORM: RECONFIGURING TERRITORIALITY
In light of the increasing frequency of these types of disputes, to
what extent do we need to reform the principles of private international law that operate in intellectual property cases? This Part
argues that the principle of territoriality needs to be reviewed; our
ability to develop a sophisticated system would benefit from a
breakdown of the principle into its constituent propositions and a
defense of each proposition on its own terms. Territoriality needs to
be explained and defended, not simply invoked.2 4 °

237. See Mark D. Rosen, Exporting the Constitution,53 EMORY L.J. 171, 172-74 (2004).

238. See Fauntleroy v. Lum, 210 U.S. 230 (1908) (considering domestic state-to-state
recognition under the Full Faith and Credit Clause).
239. See Feraud,489 F.3d at 476.
240. This Part focuses on revisions of the principle ofterritoriality somewhat independently
of the institutional context in which new rules might be adopted or policed. But, of course, the
two questions are related. Whether courts possess sufficient legitimacy to perform tasks that
ideally might be assigned to them will surely be affected by whether an institutional
infrastructure exists to buttress accountability and how that infrastructure was brought into
being. Likewise, the choice of an institutional vehicle through which to advance a particular
agenda for reform will no doubt depend upon the content of the reform. More radical
deviations from the existing approach may be hard to pursue through a hard law, consensusbased process. However, despite this inevitable dynamic between content and form, for ease
of analysis, this Article will simply identify those points where the dynamic is determinative
of a particular policy choice.
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A. General Principles
There are several general observations that guide my analysis.
First, territoriality is a principle that has always received excessive
doctrinal purchase in intellectual property law. One can adhere to
the basic premises that underlie territoriality without supporting
the full range of private international law rules that are said to
reflect the principle. This divergence between the principle and its
implementing devices continues to grow as legal systems become
less nationally confined, even if they are still largely nationally
defined. Second, the normative force of the principle has declined as
units of social and commercial organization correspond less neatly
with national borders and as private ordering has weakened the
capacity, and perhaps the claim, of the nation-state exclusively to
determine the behavior of its citizenry. Finally, many of the same
values (for example, diversity of legal regimes, tailoring of intellectual property to local needs, protecting rights on an international
basis) that the public international intellectual property system
sought to further through its promulgation of the principle of
territoriality must still be pursued, but can now best and perhaps
only be achieved by reconfiguring the principle.24 '
1. A "Bundle"of Separate NationalProperties:Sources and
Theories of Territoriality
With a literary or artistic work, rights attach upon creation and,
in some countries, fixation.2 4 2 De facto, the protected work is the
same everywhere, even if international copyright law deems that a
single creative act results as a matter of law in the creation of
almost two hundred separate national copyrights. In contrast, the
premise of separate national parcels of property is relatively
intuitive in the case of registered rights whose existence flows from

241. Cf. Graeme B. Dinwoodie, Commitments to Territoriality in InternationalCopyright
Scholarship, in ALAI COPYRIGHT-INTERNET WORLD: REPORT ON THE NEUCHATEL STUDY
SESSION 16/17 SEPTEMBER 2002, at 74 (Paul BrUgger ed., 2003) (characterizing different
approaches to territoriality in copyright law as "regressive or nationalistic," "reformed,"
"pragmatic," and "internationalist").
242. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2006).
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separate national applications.2 43 But even with registered rights,
those separate national applications might often be dealing with
identical inventions or marks. In that light, the argument for
separate national industrial property rights may seem as fragile as
"nationalizing" copyright protection of a single original work.
Such a skeptical response to separate national property rights is
most persuasive if one holds a commitment to pre-political notions
of property. Viewing intellectual property rights more instrumentally, as a matter of legislative grace, should, however, dispel some
of that skepticism and help explain the territorial nature of rights.
And such instrumentalism informs both national and international
laws. In the United States, intellectual property rights are recognized primarily to effectuate innovation policy objectives and to
ensure fair competition in the marketplace. Although civil law
countries typically are supported by a broader range of theoretical
justifications, including those reflecting natural rights impulses,
even those countries recognize the instrumentalist objectives of
intellectual property law. And the public international law premise
of territoriality reflects an underlying political commitment to preserve national autonomy to tailor innovation policy and thus the
extent of protection within sovereign political borders, consistent
with the flexible limits established by intellectual property treaties.
Moreover, even if one adopts a less instrumental approach to
intellectual property rights, focusing on the intangible values protected by patent or trademark law helps to explain a default
position of national rights. The word or other symbol that is the
tangible manifestation of trademark rights, and which may nomi243. The use of international mechanisms to facilitate multinational registration of marks,
designs, and patents has become more widespread in recent years. See Protocol Relating to
the Madrid Agreement Concerning the International Registration of Marks, June 27, 1989,
S. TREATY Doc. No. 106-41 (2000), WIPO Doc. 204(E) [hereinafter Madrid Protocol]; Geneva
Act of the Hague Agreement Concerning the International Registration of Industrial Designs,
July 2, 1999, S. TREATY Doc. No. 109-21, 2279 U.N.T.S. 3; Patent Cooperation Treaty, June
19, 1970, 28 U.S.T. 7645, 1160 U.N.T.S. 231. And increasing the use of such mechanisms has
been a priority of the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) in recent years; most
of these systems have been liberalized to encourage their broader use. However, even if the
mechanisms in these treaties are successfully invoked, the applicant still obtains a bundle of
national rights, whether under the Madrid system (marks), the PCT (patents), or the Hague
system (designs). The EU-wide Community Trademark and Community Design (Registered
and Unregistered) are different in that they give rise to a unitary right valid throughout the
European Union.
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nally be uniform across national markets, is merely a vessel for the
intangible value of goodwill that trademark law classically seeks to
protect. Even when the word or symbol is the same, the existence
and scope of that goodwill may vary from one country to another,
reflecting the different social and market conditions that pertain in
those countries. Likewise, the extent to which the defendant's
nominally constant cross-border conduct threatens to interfere with
those national bundles of goodwill may turn on features of the
national market.
In the patent context, the extent of the right conferred by the
patent on an invention that is de facto the same invention as presented to the patent office in another country will be a function of
the invention's novelty and inventiveness."' That measure might
also vary widely from country to country.2 45 As a practical matter,
this is reflected in the language of the claims of the different
national patents which define the invention de iure, regardless of
the commonality of the patented product across national markets.
Patent examiners in different countries, and patent counsel drafting
claims and responding to office actions, may introduce different
limitations in order to avoid prior art or deal with other impediments to patentability that vary according to the national market
at issue. The grounding of patent law in a public bargain, that
different patent offices might in loco publici negotiate differently
according to their own respective innovation policies, validates
separate property rights. But, so too, the fact that the degree of
inventiveness might de facto vary from one country to another
requires even noninstrumentalists to recognize a valid starting
point of national rights.
Thus, the idea of separate property rights has a solid conceptual foundation, both in intellectual property theory and in the
sovereignty-based underpinnings of the classical international
legal regime. However, that fact no longer justifies the full force of
the territoriality principle. Social and commercial structures that
were predominantly national in the late nineteenth century have
244. 35 U.S.C. § 102 (2006).
245. For a discussion on the universalization of the content of prior art and the adoption
of absolute novelty standards, see Margo A. Bagley, Patently Unconstitutional: The
GeographicalLimitationon PriorArt in a Small World, 87 MINN. L. REv. 679, 729-36 (2003);
Craig Nard, In Defense of GeographicDisparity,88 MINN L. REv. 222 (2003).
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taken on a more international hue, creating a transnational marketplace where the grounding of national rights in national differences
is less compelling. Similarly, the prescriptive claims of a nationstate to regulate, or at least to regulate exclusively without a greater
regard for foreign and international prescriptive claims, may be
more open to contest. The increasing inability to contain the effects
of national regulation within national borders demands a less
nationalistic approach to the prescriptive scope of law. At the same
time, the power of a nation-state to regulate fully within its own
borders has declined both normatively and descriptively, requiring
an acknowledgment of the interdependence of nations. Foreign and
international interests and institutions are thus more relevant, an
assumption that territoriality largely discounts as a matter of both
right and power.
The transborder activity and power of private nonstate actors
must also be factored into the equation. We have witnessed an
upsurge in private ordering, particularly as a result of the application of digital rights management techniques by rightholders and
the prominence of multinational intermediaries, such as Internet
Service Providers or search engines, in controlling access to information products. Private ordering may create a different balance,
not only between rightholders and users, but also between international homogeneity and national sovereignty.2 4 6 Increasingly, it is
the activities and structure of international business actors that
determine whether norms will be developed and enforced similarly
across borders notwithstanding the nominal commitment of nationstates to territoriality and their formal claims of legal sovereignty.
Moreover, even if markets were still national and the prescriptive
claims of the nation-state were unchanged from the late nineteenth
century, not all of the principles of private international intellectual
property law would necessarily follow. For example, the existence
of separate national property rights does not mandate a philosophy
of exclusive jurisdiction. To be sure, territoriality of rights does raise
more acutely further policy considerations such as international
comity and competence to adjudicate foreign law. Absent separate

246. See Graeme B. Dinwoodie, Private Ordering and the Creation of International
CopyrightNorms: The Role of PublicStructuring,160 J. INSTITUTIONAL & THEORETICAL ECON.
161, 168-77 (2004).

770

WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 51:711

national property rights and different intellectual property laws,
these concerns may be less prominent, and we might be more
comfortable in applying foreign law. But these concerns of comity
and competence could be accommodated within a system that
permitted more extended and less exclusive adjudicatory authority
over the subject matter of intellectual property claims. And contemporary developments, which have diminished the prescriptive
force of territoriality, have likewise made those accommodations
of private international law more easy to contemplate. With international harmonization of substantive law, the development of
sophisticated information retrieval systems, the enhanced personal
and professional interchange among judges, and the development
of specialized courts-to name but a few-arguments about a lack
of judicial competence are less persuasive. At the same time, the
frequency of transborder disputes has made the cost of insisting on
serial national litigation more substantial. The reality of international disputes about international markets makes partitioning of
adjudication seem a costly and
romantic hankering for the ineffi247
ciencies of a balkanized past.
To be sure, there is social value in the cultural diversity which
national markets support; there is learning to be garnered from the
experimentation that national regulation facilitates; and there is
political legitimacy as well as local efficiencies to be gained from the
sovereignty and accountability that territoriality promotes.248 But
there are gains from facilitating international exploitation as
foreign works are injected into new markets and cultural diversity
enhanced; there are legitimacy gains both from making rights real
and enforceable and long-term and from weakening the grip of the
nation-state as the political unit of a citizenry more readily affiliated with a network of political institutions. International trade and
247. Taking this reality into account may even reduce the lazy analytical assimilation that
might occur when properly separate national claims are dealt with together for inappropriate
reasons of efficiency. See Dinwoodie, Trademarks and Territory, supra note 11, at 949-50
(discussing concerns that courts hearing consolidated litigation might simply treat discrete
national claims as one claim).
248. The political legitimacy argument also rests on unduly simplistic assumptions about
patterns of commerce and immigration, as well as insufficient attention to the transborder
nature of modern political economies. The political economy of intellectual property, fed by
transnational groups that pressure national legislatures, resists any simple model of
procedural representational legitimacy.
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digital communication technologies have altered the balance between the global and the local, or at least require us to reconsider
how we can best continue to accommodate the benefits of both. The
gains of rigid adherence to territoriality appear less certain, and the
opportunities of internationalism appear more real than ever before.
In that light, unquestioning adherence to the full panoply of devices
by which the territorial model was sustained appears, at best,
quixotic.
2. Territorialityas a Disabling Concept
The above analysis does not offer a particular prescription for the
development of a private international law of intellectual property.
However, it does suggest that the prescriptive and practical claims
of territoriality might warrant reconsideration, or at least some of
the doctrines that depend upon that principle for their vitality
might be reviewed.
In contemporary multiterritorial intellectual property disputes
the primary challenge for courts is not a lack of authority to
prescribe (or, with the exception of exclusive jurisdiction rules of
subject matter jurisdiction, to adjudicate). Instead, it is an excess of
authority that presents a problem, which means, in turn, that
enforcement is less frequently a problem that arises. Particularly
in online disputes, but even in offline disputes, several countries are
likely to have a legitimate prescriptive or adjudicative claim with
respect to the dispute. But multiplying the sources of authority also
has the effect of diluting authority: it is an excess of shared
authority that characterizes contemporary intellectual property
disputes.
In that environment of multiple, weaker prescriptive claims,
application of the principle of territoriality has the capacity either
to underregulate or overregulate the marketplace.2 4 9 If activity must
249. This discussion focuses largely on prescriptive authority, but because of exclusive
jurisdiction and homing tendencies discussed below, the question of adjudicatory authority
is in practice tied closely to prescriptive claims. The principle of exclusive jurisdiction is the
most significant limit on this phenomenon of multiple shared authority insofar as it
constrains subject matter jurisdiction. One of the reforms discussed in this Article is the need
to separate those authorities, which itself gives more room to reach an accommodated
solution.
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be exclusively confined to the territory of a state in order to assert
prescriptive authority, then such a notion of territoriality would
largely foreclose any state from acting to prescribe.25 ° Just as it is
very hard for states to confine their regulation territorially, so too
private actors, whether right-holders, users, competitors, or infringers, are largely unable to stop the effects of their activity at the
borders. Indeed, often this disregard of borders reflects a conscious
effort to engage an international audience or market.
To be sure, the principle of territoriality was used historically to
deny authority to third party states to adjudicate or to prescribe.2 51
But the principle of territoriality will rarely be interpreted in this
restrictive fashion, outside the context of exclusive jurisdiction.
Giving territoriality this reading would reduce its application to
cases in which only one state had an interest in the application of its
law to the dispute at hand. And, in the present environment of
international exploitation, this would be far too disabling of
jurisdiction. Today, a single state will more rarely have an exclusive
authority to prescribe in the context of a transborder dispute. Thus,
some less demanding notion of territoriality must be required to
support a state's prescriptive interest.
3. Territorialityas an Enabling Concept
Having seen the disabling effects of reading territoriality strictly,
one could adopt a much more liberal approach: any conduct or effect
within the territory of a state might be seen as sufficient to sustain
adjudicatory or prescriptive jurisdiction. However, it is the excess
of authority in today's world, rather than its shared nature, that
makes this a less than satisfactory proposition. Information products that are exploited internationally are likely to touch upon the
territory of many nations, particularly in the online context where
activity is ubiquitous. Adopting this approach would lead to overregulation and the imposition of potentially inconsistent obligations.25 2
250. Cf. Andrew T. Guzman, Choice of Law: New Foundations,90 GEO. L.J. 883, 909-12
(2002) (arguing that "[w]here countries cannot (or do not) apply their laws extraterritorially
there will be under-regulation").
251. See supra text accompanying notes 8-18.
252. See Dinwoodie, A New Copyright Order,supra note 1, at 537 (noting a problem of too
many loci delicti); Guzman, supra note 250, at 906-09.
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Stated in less conclusory terms, this approach is too enabling of
jurisdiction. In effect, it would implement a philosophy of extraterritoriality rather than territoriality.
4. Between Territorialityand Extraterritoriality:A Philosophy
of Restraint
The key to adapting to the realities of excess, shared authority
lies in restraint: the existence of prescriptive and adjudicating
authority has to be distinguished from the exercise of that authority. The purest act of sovereignty is to foreswear from acting in
circumstances in which it is descriptively and prescriptively possible
to do so.253 Territorial connections that are sufficient to sustain a
nominal interest should not support the exercise of jurisdiction that
effectively prescribes globally. In this climate, the important judicial
tools become doctrines of abstention and systems of equilibrium
rather than binary tests of the existence of jurisdiction. 5 4
Highlighting a philosophy of restraint might appear paradoxical
given the most concrete reform suggestions in this Article (allowing
the consolidated adjudication of infringement claims under domestic
and foreign intellectual property laws) and by my prior proposals in
choice of law. 5 To appreciate the consistency of these positions, it
is important to recognize that the restraint for which I argue
operates from a baseline in which the ubiquitousness of contemporary activity theoretically permits the exercise of jurisdiction by
multiple national courts in a very large number of cases. As the
253. The citizens of London, through the Corporation of the City, still retain their ancient
privilege of being able to bar the Sovereign from entering their streets. Caroline Davies, Pearl
Sword Opens City to Sovereign, TELEGRAPH, June 4, 2002, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/
news/uknews/1396320fPearl-Sword-opens-City-to-sovereign.html. Thus, on state occasions
when the Queen enters the boundaries of the city, she must seek the formal permission of the
Lord Mayor of London. Id. When the Royal carriage is about enter the city of London, the
Sovereign is met by the Lord Mayor. Id. The Mayor exercises the sovereignty of the citizens
of London by offering his sword to the Queen downwards and permitting entry to the City. Id.;
see also Barack Obama, Inaugural Address (Jan. 20, 2009) ("[Plower alone cannot protect us,
nor does it entitle us to do as we please. Instead, [earlier generations] knew that our power
grows through its prudent use. Our security emanates from the justness of our cause; the
force of our example; the tempering qualities of humility and restraint.").
254. Cf. McBee v. Delica Co., 417 F.3d 107, 117 (1st Cir. 2005), discussed infra text
accompanying notes 286-89.
255. See Dinwoodie, A New Copyright Order,supra note 1; infra Part III.
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number of disputes that cannot fairly and appropriately be allocated
to the exclusive competence of a single national court or a single law
comes to predominate over the classical model of territoriallyconfined disputes, rules of adjudicative and prescriptive jurisdiction
must be less absolute. The next challenge under such a model, of
course, is to develop the tools that filter out the cases in which,
despite possessing an interest under a liberal conception of territoriality, a national court should decline to hear a case or to apply
its own law.
B. ForgingTools of Restraint
1. Conduct but Not Effects
There may be other rule-oriented ways to limit the notion of
territoriality and thus raise the bar necessary to trigger a state
interest to prescribe. One approach might fasten on a distinction
common in private international law, namely, between jurisdiction
based on conduct and jurisdiction based on effects.
To explore this possibility, we might consider the history of
applicable law in intellectual property cases. As noted above, the
majority approach to the question of infringement in intellectual
property litigation is to apply the lex loci protectionis, which
correlates in most cases with the lex loci delicti. Copyright and
patent liability attach to defined acts committed without authorization, and thus the loci delicti historically was interpreted (with ease,
it was thought) as where the act of unauthorized copying of a work
or unauthorized sale of the patented invention (to use but two
examples) occurred.2 5 Because this was thought to be a simple
factual inquiry, copyright and patent decisions rarely ventured into
any detailed explication of what the lex loci delicti might mean.257
It may have also been true in earlier times that effects were
largely felt at the locus of conduct. But when domestic effects were
alleged to flow from foreign conduct, copyright plaintiffs lacking
256. See Itar-Tass Russian News Agency v. Russian Kurier, Inc., 153 F.3d 82, 89 (2d. Cir.
1998) ("Mhe Nimmer treatise briefly (and perhaps optimistically) suggests that conflicts
issues 'have rarely proved troublesome in the law of copyright."' (citation omitted)).
257. Domestic copyright law does contain scope for "effects" analysis in, for example, the
context of defenses such as fair use. See 17 U.S.C. § 107(4) (2006) (effect on the market).
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conduct in the United States explicitly sought to rely on effects in
the United States to sustain jurisdiction.2 5 On the whole, these
arguments have been (nominally) unsuccessful.25 9 Is requiring
domestic "conduct" a form of restraint that can therefore be used to
limit and interpret an otherwise capacious territoriality principle?2 6 °
Probably not. As a purely descriptive matter, this nominal barrier
to the application of U.S. law has in practice proved porous.
Although efforts to develop an effects-based extension of the reach
of U.S. copyright laws have failed, the U.S. courts have exercised
prescriptive authority expansively through localization determinations that find an "act" or "conduct" in the United States. This form
of extraterritoriality has thus been achieved by interpretation of the
substantive provisions of copyright law.2 6'
Moreover, as a prescriptive matter, it is becoming too easy to
transfer the core acts of infringement offshore without any diminution in the harmful local effects that states are surely entitled to
regulate. Increasingly, bodies of economic law (for example, competition law or securities law) are being applied extraterritorially,
based upon local effects that are inevitable in an integrated world
economy. Some regard for effects is therefore probably relevant,
and, if courts do not permit such arguments to be made transparently, sympathetic courts are likely to manipulate localization or
substantive rules to prevent the development of information
havens. This was a lesson of life under the rigid rules of the First
Restatement of Conflicts, leading the Second Restatement to a
position of greater flexibility exercised with due regard to basic
conflicts principles.26 2
Trademark law has always presented an even harder case for
those seeking to rely on the filter of "conduct" to limit the number
258. See Subafilms, Ltd. v. MGM-Pathe Commc'ns Co., 24 F.3d 1088, 1095 (9th Cir. 1994)
(en banc).
259. Id. at 1099.
260. Some scholars would focus not only on the place of conduct, but, more restrictively
still, on the place of the acts giving rise to primary infringement. See Graeme W. Austin,
Importing Kazaa-ExportingGrokster, 72 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 577,
596 (2006) [hereinafter Austin, ImportingKazaa] ("Though the lines between various forms
of domestic infringement may be blurry .... geopolitical lines are not: the territoriality
principle should preclude application of U.S. liability theories where the primary acts of
infringement occur abroad.").
261. See supra text accompanying notes 60-62 (root copy).
262. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 6 (1971).
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of nations with a territoriality-derived prescriptive interest.
Liability for trademark infringement proper for some period of time
was dependent upon the "affixation" of the infringing mark to a
product, and some scholars now argue that that requirement has
been transferred into a requirement that the defendant use the
mark as a mark.2 6 At the very least, the defendant must make some
use of the right-holder's mark or of a mark confusingly similar
thereto." These elements of the infringement action are cast as
conduct-based inquiries that, at least until the advent of the
Internet, seemed as deceptively simple as in the case of copyright or
patent.
However, other than arguably in the context of use of an identical
mark for identical goods,2 6 liability is now dependent upon the use
causing likely confusion, which might ensue somewhere remote
from the act of affixation or use. Localizing the act of modern
confusion-based trademark infringement thus tests the limits of the
lex loci delicti'shistorical tension between place of conduct and place
of effects in ways that do not come up as directly in copyright or
patent cases. Effects are therefore a consideration that is central to
trademark liability. A conduct filter would be an especially unwise
means of restraining territoriality in trademark law.
2. Qualitative and ComparativeAssessment of Effects
If effects must be potentially relevant to notions of territoriality,
thus making conduct unhelpful as the sole determinant of territoriality, then perhaps a qualitative assessment of effects might
263. See Margreth Barrett, Internet Trademark Suits and the Demise of 'Trademark Use,"
39 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 371, 387 (2006); Stacey L. Dogan & Mark A. Lemley, Trademark and
Consumer Search Costs on the Internet, 41 HOUS. L. REV. 777, 798-99 (2004); Uli Widmaier,
Use, Liability and the Structure of Trademark Law, 33 HoFSTRA L. REV. 603, 622 (2004); see
also 1-800 Contacts, Inc. v. Whenu.com, Inc., 414 F.3d 400, 412 (2nd Cir. 2005) (refusing to
allow confusion to substitute for unauthorized use in determining trademark liability). Contra
Graeme B. Dinwoodie & Mark D. Janis, Confusion Over Use: Contextualism in Trademark
Law, 92 IOWA L. REV. 1597, 1625-28 (2007) (arguing against the existence or wisdom of such
a requirement).
264. See Holiday Inns, Inc. v. 800 Reservation, Inc., 86 F.3d 619, 625-26 (6th Cir. 1996).
265. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 12, art. 16(1). Even in that context, the greater
scope of protection may simply reflect (at least in use-based jurisdictions) a presumption that
"double identity" uses will cause confusion. But cf. Case C-487/07, L'Ordal SA v. Bellure NV,
[2009] E.T.M.R. 55 (E.C.J. 2009) (discussing Article 5(1)(a) of Trade Mark Directive).
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still serve a filtering role. Given the centrality of effects to substantive trademark law discussed above, we might expect trademark law
to offer some clues about the effects that might be qualitatively
assessed. Surprisingly, despite the more long-standing potential in
trademark law for unauthorized remote use to give rise to actionable local effects, case law does not generally reveal any substantial
discussion of where an act of trademark infringement occurred or
how the prescriptive claim of that place weighed against the claims
of the place where effects are felt.2 66 One can find some discussion
of "place" as courts determined the existence or geographical scope
of trademarks when competing remote users asserted common law
rights and when plaintiffs with registered rights sought protection
in areas of nonuse.6 7 However, that discussion is typically cast in
the language of substantive trademark norms rather than the
values of private international law. Has consumer association
developed? Is confusion likely?
Two trademark contexts in which the relevant effects have been
examined in ways that resemble the method of private international
law are the adaptation of the concept of "use" to online activity
found in the WIPO SCT Joint Recommendation on Internet Use
and the extraterritorial application of U.S. law. In both contexts,
the considerations that assist in identifying relevant effects are
wrapped up with substantive objectives. But both represent transparent efforts to separate those territorial effects that warrant the
exercise of jurisdiction from those that suggest deferring to the law
of some other place, most obviously the place of the conduct that
generated the effects in question. These examples suggest that to
assist in this exercise we can look both at the nature of the local
effects and the nature of the competing interests.
The Joint Recommendation was prompted by doubts about
whether, for example, online "use" of a mark in France should be
treated as use of the mark in the United States sufficient to acquire
266. At least it did not until the Internet made this inevitable. See Playboy Enters. v.
Chuckleberry Publ'g, Inc., 939 F. Supp. 1032, 1039-40 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (interpreting place of
distribution of products made available online in assessing motion for contempt of injunction
in trademark case, but still not talking in terms of prescriptive interests).
267. See Nat'l Ass'n for Healthcare Commc'ns, Inc. v. Cent. Ark. Area Agency on Aging,
Inc., 257 F.3d 732, 735-38 (8th Cir. 2001); Dawn Donut Co. v. Hart's Food Stores, Inc., 267
F.2d 358, 362-63 (2d Cir. 1959); see also Dinwoodie, Trademarks and Territory, supra note 11,
at 893-901, 928-35.
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rights or to infringe the rights of others.2 68 One could adopt an
expansive approach to territoriality and regard use online as use
anywhere, implicating the territorial interests of every state where
Internet access is available. Some early outlier cases did just that,
prompting the World Intellectual Property Organization Standing
Committee on the Law of Trademarks, Industrial Designs and
Geographical Indications (SCT) to develop provisions on the concept
of use on the Internet, which were adopted as a nonbinding instrument (a Joint Recommendation) by the WIPO General Assemblies
and the Paris Union in 2001.269
Under the Joint Recommendation, use of a sign on the Internet
should only be treated as use in any particular state if the use of the
sign has a "commercial effect" in that state. 2v° That is, effects were
adopted as the means of assessing conduct, and, interestingly,
effects were perceived as a means of moderating an expansive
interpretation of what might amount to relevant conduct. The Joint
Recommendation lists factors relevant to a determination of
whether a sign has a commercial effect in a state, and whether use
should be deemed to have occurred in that state. 271 The factors are
nonexhaustive and include whether the user is doing, or planning
to do, business in a particular state, although use of the sign can
have a commercial effect in a country without the user doing
business there. 27 2 The language and currency used on the website
where the mark is used, as well as any explicit disclaimer of the
ability to deliver goods in a particular state, would be relevant.
Actual restraints on the ability of the producer to deliver goods, for
example, regulatory hurdles, would also provide guidance, as would
whether the website had actually been visited by persons from a
particular state.2 73
268. See supra note 263.
269. WIPO, Joint Recommendation ConcerningProvisions on the Protectionof Marks, and

Other IndustrialProperty Rights in Signs, on the Internet, WIPO Doc. 845(E) (Oct. 3, 2001),
available at http://www.wipo.int/about-ip/en/developmentiplaw/Pub845.htm [hereinafter
Joint Recommendation on Internet Use]. Acquisition rules require "use" in commerce, and
infringement requires use of the mark and perhaps more.
270. See id. art. 2.
271. Id. art. 3.
272. Id. art. 3(1)(a).
273. The full listing of factors is found in Article 3 of the Joint Recommendation on Internet
Use. See id. art. 3. For an analysis of the wisdom of the particular factors listed, see

Dinwoodie, PrivateInternationalAspects, supra note 64,

103-05.
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The second component of the Joint Recommendation limits the
liability of an owner of trademark rights in one country that uses its
mark online in a way that has a commercial effect in another
state.27 4 In particular, such a mark owner should not be liable to the
mark owner in that foreign state prior to receiving a "notification of
infringement," provided that the mark owner's rights were not
acquired in bad faith and that contact details are provided on the
website where the sign is displayed.27 5 Even upon receiving a
notification, the user can avoid liability by expeditiously taking
reasonable steps "to avoid a commercial effect in the [country] in
which the allegedly infringed right is protected" or to avoid confusion with the mark owner in that country.2 76 These steps should not
unreasonably burden the commercial activity the user carries out
over the Internet,2 77 and courts should avoid global injunctions.278
Indeed, generally in crafting relief, a court should "take account ...
of the number of Member States in which the infringed right is also
protected, the number of Member States in which the infringing
sign is protected by a right, or the relative extent of use on the
'
Internet."2 79
The first component of the SCT Joint Recommendation thus
represents an effort to identify the considerations that would suggest effects of the type that should not trigger substantial prescriptive interest. The second component suggests that, even when there
are effects sufficiently substantial to support prescriptive claims,
these might need to be balanced against competing interests of
other states. In performing that balancing, the substantive objectives of trademark law (the avoidance of confusion) should be taken
into account, emphasizing that the development of rules in this area
might best occur not through abstract assertions of state interests,
but with an eye to substantive policy goals. Finally, the fact274. Joint Recommendation on Internet Use, supra note 269, art. 9.
275. Id.
276. Id. Note 10.02.
277. See id. art. 15. If those steps include the use of a disclaimer in accordance with the
terms of Article 9 of the Recommendation, the user is conclusively presumed to have satisfied
the standard. Such disclaimers should, inter alia, make clear that the user of the sign does
not intend to deliver goods to the particular member state where a conflicting right exists and
that the user has no relationship with the owner of the conflicting right. See id. art. 9.
278. See id. art. 14.
279. See id. Note 13.04.
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intensive nature of the SCT approach suggests that these rules are
more likely to emanate from concrete analysis of factual disputes
than from the development of a priori principles about the respective claims of states with particular contacts.
A similar conceptual structure is found in cases involving the
extraterritorial application of U.S. trademark law (often litigated as
a question of subject matter jurisdiction, but effectively assessing
prescriptive authority). For example, in the context of trade occurring across the U.S.-Mexican and U.S.-Canadian borders, one could
easily have imagined substantial litigation concerning how to define
the conduct (use) that localized the dispute within the United States
as the lex loci protectionis. Instead, the ambiguities of the lex loci
protectionis were mitigated through a willingness to consider
awarding relief extraterritorially based upon effects in the forum
notwithstanding that the conduct at issue occurred abroad.28 ° More
particularly, the courts imposed a nontrivial threshold of effects
within the United States, took into account competing foreign
interests, and reached a solution through careful factual analysis
rather than through mechanical doctrinal formulations.2 '
Within the Second Circuit in particular, courts have insisted
that there must be a substantial effect on U.S. commerce. 282 "Some"
effects are insufficient, although a minority view outside the Second
Circuit 2 3 permits the exercise of jurisdiction based upon this lesser
showing. 2 4 Moreover, those effects within the United States must
280. See Steele v. Bulova Watch Co., 344 U.S. 280, 285-86 (1952); see also Graeme W.
Austin, The Story of Steele v. Bulova: Trademarks on the Line, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
STORIES 395, 412, 414 (Jane C. Ginsburg & Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss eds., 2006); cf. Vanity
Fair Mills v. T. Eaton & Co., 234 F.2d 633, 642-44 (2d Cir. 1956).
281. See, e.g., Vanity FairMills, 234 F.2d at 633.
282. Id. at 641-42.
283. Although the approach of the Second Circuit is the one most explicitly connected to
the opinion of the Supreme Court in Steele v. Bulova, other circuits appear increasingly to be
developing tests that in differing respects depart from the doctrinal Vanity Fair factors.
Courts in the Second Circuit still tend to work within the express framework of the Vanity
Fairfactors, while courts in the Ninth and Fifth Circuits apply an effects test modeled on the
test applied in the antitrust context. However, the substance of these different tests is not
radically different, and the conceptual structure identified in the text probably holds true for
the approach of most circuits.
284. See, e.g., Atl. Richfield Co. v. Arco Globus Intl Co., 150 F.3d 189, 192 & n.4 (2d Cir.
1998) (insisting on substantial effects); Totalplan Corp. of Am. v. Colborne, 14 F.3d 824, 830
(2d Cir. 1994) (insisting on substantial effects); see also McBee v. Delica Co. 417 F.3d 107, 111
(1st Cir. 2005); Int'l Caf6 S.A.L. v. Hard Rock CafM Int'l (U.S.A.), Inc., 252 F.3d 1274, 1278-79
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be weighed along with the nationality of the defendant, as the U.S.
courts have a greater claim to regulate the foreign conduct of their
own citizens, and the potential of a conflict with foreign trademark
rights or, perhaps, foreign trademark law that declines
to assign
285
exclusive rights to any party must also be considered.
Likewise, in a recent case, McBee v. Delica, the First Circuit
rejected "the notion that a comity analysis is part of subject matter
jurisdiction. Comity considerations, including potential conflicts
with foreign trademark law, are properly treated as questions of
whether a court should, in its discretion, decline to exercise subject
matter jurisdiction that it already possesses."2" The First Circuit's
approach is a slight reformulation of Vanity Fair,but in substance
is likely to reach similar results. McBee makes an important contribution to this field, however, by explicitly recognizing that the
"substantial effects" that support jurisdiction are to be weighed
against comity concerns in determining whether to exercise that
jurisdiction. 287 This endorses a move from binary doctrines of jurisdiction to concerns about abstention.2 8 8 Moreover, the court stressed
(1 1th Cir. 2001) (applying Vanity Fair). For the minority view, see Am. Rice, Inc. v. Ark. Rice
Growers, 701 F.2d 408, 414 (5th Cir.1983) (holding the degree of effect on U.S. commerce may
not be substantial, but some effect may be sufficient); see also Nintendo of Am., Inc. v.
Aeropower Co., 34 F.3d 246, 250-51 (4th Cir. 1994) (requiring "significant impact" on U.S.
commerce); Reebok Intl, Ltd. v. Marnatech Enters., Inc., 970 F.2d 552, 554 (9th Cir. 1992)
(holding there must be "some effect" on U.S. commerce); Wells Fargo & Co. v. Wells Fargo
Express Co., 556 F.2d 406, 428 (9th Cir. 1977) (rejecting the "substantial effect" test adopted
by the Second Circuit and approving the "some effect" test previously rejected by the Second
Circuit as part of the comparable test used to determine extraterritorial reach of the federal
antitrust laws).
285. Cf. Les Ballets Trockadero de Monte Carlo, Inc. v. Trevino, 945 F. Supp. 563, 567-68
(S.D.N.Y. 1996) (noting uncontradicted testimony of plaintiff's expert on Japanese trademark
law to the effect that defendant's application would fail because the plaintiffs mark was well
known in Japan); see also Joint Recommendation on Internet Use, supra note 269, art. 9
(making the benefits of the provisions available to good faith users "permitted to use the sign,
in the manner in which it is being used on the Internet, under the law of [a country] to which
the user has a close connection").
286. McBee, 417 F.3d at 111 (holding that in order for a plaintiff to reach foreign activities
of foreign defendants in American courts, the "complained-of activities [must] have a
substantial effect on United States commerce, viewed in light of the purposes of the Lanham
Act").
287. Id.
288. See supra text accompanying notes 253-54. My only quibble with the approach of the
McBee court would be that the court appears to assimilate adjudicatory and prescriptive
jurisdiction (although that may well be in line with the prevailing philosophy of exclusive
jurisdiction in trademark law). Cf. Vanity Fair Mills v. T. Eaton Co., 234 F.2d 633, 645-48 (2d
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that the "complained-of activities [must] have a substantial effect on
United States commerce, viewed in light of the purposes of the
Lanham Act."2 9 That is, the substantive policy goals provide a lens
through which to assess the effects relevant to jurisdiction.
The final element of the conceptual structure found in the Joint
Recommendation and extraterritoriality context is perhaps best
typified by Sterling Drug,Inc. v. BayerAG.2" ° Because the defendant
in that case was a German company holding the German trademark
to the mark BAYER for drugs, the American plaintiff, which owned
the rights to the BAYER mark in the United States, would, under
the prevailing doctrine in the Second Circuit, be unable to obtain
relief from a U.S. court that extended to uses in Germany. 29 l Even
if those uses made their way to the American public (for example,
in press releases likely to be reported on in the United States, or in
advertisements in newspapers with significant U.S. distribution),
these effects had to be balanced against the nationality of and the
German rights held by the defendant. When the district court
granted relief notwithstanding these considerations, Bayer appealed
and the government of Germany appeared as amicus curiae,
contending that the extraterritorial prohibitions of the injunction
failed to respect its sovereign rights.2 92
Although the Second Circuit vacated the district court's injunction,293 the court emphasized that on remand the district court could
grant relief against conduct abroad that had substantial effects in
the United States provided it took into account the other considerations, namely the Vanity Fairfactors.2 94 It so held notwithstanding
that the established doctrine in the Second Circuit suggested that
mere effects in the United States were insufficient to support

Cir. 1956) (considering whether to assume jurisdiction over Canadian trademark claims on
the basis of diversity of citizenship, but deciding to dismiss the case on the basis of forum non
conveniens). Substantial effects may support a U.S. court assuming adjudicatory jurisdiction,
but the interests of other states might lead that court to apply a law other than that of the
United States alone.
289. McBee, 417 F.3d at 111 (emphasis added).
290. 14 F.3d 733 (2d Cir. 1994).
291. See supranotes 224-26 and accompanying text.
292. Sterling, 14 F.3d at 744.
293. Id. at 751.
294. Id. at 746.
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extraterritorial jurisdiction when nationality and foreign rights
pointed in the other direction.
[I]f we applied the Vanity Fairtest mechanically to the instant
case, we would forbid the application of the Lanham Act abroad
against a foreign corporation that holds superior rights to the
mark under foreign law. But such an unrefined application of
that case might mean that we fail to preserve the Lanham Act's
goals of protecting American consumers against confusion, and
protecting holders of American trademarks against misappropriation of their marks.s5
The court thus insisted on viewing the relevant considerations of
private international law (the Vanity Fair factors) through a
substantive lens. And that analysis would turn heavily on the
context of the particular dispute before the court.2 96 The court
instructed the district court that "[iun establishing the parameters
of injunctive relief in the case of lawful concurrent users, a court
' Although
must take account of the realities of the marketplace."2 97
the court could not prohibit every act of a foreign corporation that
may confuse American consumers, the court could "grant an extraterritorial injunction carefully crafted to prohibit only those foreign
uses of the mark by Bayer AG that are likely to have significant
trademark-impairing effects on United States commerce.
Perhaps most importantly, the Second Circuit recognized that in
an integrated economy in which rights remain territorial, accommodation will require a careful balancing of rights:
Where, as in the instant case, both parties have legitimate
interests, consideration of those interests must receive especially
sensitive accommodation in the international context. While
Bayer AG suggests that we must accept these conflicts as the
unavoidable result of an international community of nations in
which each nation exercises the power to grant trademark

295. Id.
296. See id. at 746-47 (commenting on very specific examples offered by the parties in view
of their ability to dispel confusion without substantially impeding the activities of the German
defendant to engage in permitted business activity in Germany).
297. Id. at 747 (citation omitted).
298. See id. at 747 (discussion of GAT and Roche).
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rights, we prefer to allow the District Court to fashion an
appropriately limited injunction with only those extraterritorial
provisions reasonably necessary to protect against significant
trademark-impairing effects on American commerce."'
Thus, a qualitative assessment of local effects, tempered by
consideration of the legitimacy of foreign conduct, informed by the
differing prescriptive authority that a state may have over its own
citizens and foreign nationals, and performed with an eye to the
substantive goals of intellectual property law,300 might provide a
model of restraint. And, as seen both in the WIPO Joint Recommendation and case law on the extraterritorial application of U.S.
trademark law, the precise forms of that restraint can best be
ascertained by contextual analysis of facts in concrete cases, offering
remedial measures that might not fully vindicate one law or the
other, but reflect an accommodation of the two.30 ' These are features
to recall when considering reforms of the content of private international law and how best to develop that law.
3. Adjudicative and PrescriptiveJurisdiction;Declining
Jurisdiction
Although I will argue that this restrained model does offer lessons
of more general application beyond trademark law, let me note one
important caveat. In the preceding discussion of how to reconfigure
territorial authority, I have not distinguished between adjudicative
and prescriptive jurisdiction.0 2 Nor have I set out detailed grounds
299. Id.
300. See Austin, Importing Kazaa, supra note 260, at 614 (suggesting that international
copyright litigation should take into account not only the structural aspects of territoriality
implicit in the Berne Convention but also the substantive goals of ensuring the effective
protection of authors).
301. See McBee v. Delica Co., 417 F.3d 107, 118 (1st Cir. 2005) ("The reach of the Lanham
Act depends on context; the nature of the analysis of the jurisdictional question may vary with
that context.").
302. Drawing a distinction between the two concepts is perhaps most likely to occur if
courts began to view cross-border disputes through the lens of private international law. See
supra note 100 (discussing patent law). However, the willingness of the U.S. courts to apply
U.S. law extraterritorially has largely forestalled judicial discussion over where to localize the
tort of trademark infringement, one form that private international analysis takes. To be
sure, the Playboy court was required to determine where "distribution" of products made
available online occurred in assessing a motion for contempt of an existing trademark
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establishing the circumstances in which courts should decline to
exercise the authority they possess.
The assimilation of adjudicatory and prescriptive authority
reflects existing trademark law in the United States, where the two
are effectively assimilated by the philosophy of exclusive jurisdiction. If U.S. law does not apply to protect U.S. rights, then U.S.
courts do not possess subject matter jurisdiction." 3 Patent law
remains likewise committed to exclusive jurisdiction rules. Courts
in the European Union and the United States have departed from
that philosophy only really in copyright cases. However, under the
view of private international law advanced in this Article, the
inapplicability of U.S. law to any or all of the dispute should not of
itself prevent the U.S. courts from exercising adjudicatory jurisdiction.
The decoupling of adjudicatory and prescriptive jurisdiction
allows the different parts of private international law to contribute
to providing a nuanced solution to transborder disputes. Thus, there
may be circumstances in which local effects are sufficient to sustain
adjudicatory jurisdiction, but some law other than that of the
United States should apply to some or all of the dispute. °4 The U.S.
Constitution imposes limits on the nature of the contacts that are
sufficient to satisfy Due Process standards. We should, however, be
careful to avoid assimilating that standard and the question of
injunction. But again, the court did not talk in terms of the localization considerations that
typically inform private international law determinations. See Playboy Enters., Inc. v.
Chuckleberry Publ'g, Inc., 939 F. Supp. 1032, 1039-40 (S.D.N.Y. 1996). The WIPO Joint
Recommendation on Use now creates a framework for asking where to localize online use
through interpretation of what amounts to use. And, of course, as emphasized above,
extraterritoriality analysis can be an alternative context in which questions of private
international law are classically addressed. More commonly, however, even in trademark
cases, the scope of any departures from territoriality are considered under the rubric of
substantive doctrine. Thus, for example, the well-known mark doctrine protects marks used
and registered only abroad against infringement in the United States. See Grupo Gigante SA
de CV v. Dallo & Co., Inc., 391 F.3d 1088, 1093-99 (9th Cir. 2004). See generally Dinwoodie,
Trademarks and Territory, supranote 11, at 919-32. Thus, these problems of the continued
force of territoriality can be dealt with through substantive rules or explicit rules of private
international law. See supratext accompanying notes 44-62. But the private international law
route is the one more likely to result in the separation of adjudicatory and prescriptive
jurisdiction.
303. See Barcelona.com, Inc. v. Excelentisimo Ayuntamiento De Barcelona, 330 F.3d 617,
628 (4th Cir. 2003).
304. See supra text accompanying note 285.
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effects sufficient to render local law the applicable law. The ALI
Principles, for example, permit courts to exercise jurisdiction based
upon local effects," 5 but adopt a different, less flexible test for choice
of law that is more conduct-based." 6
Moreover, as the Supreme Court of Canada recognized in Tariff
22, the existence of prescriptive authority does not always mean
that the legislator has or should exercise that authority.0 7 One
simple tool of restraint is for courts to refrain from assuming that
a state would always wish its law to apply to the entirety of a
dispute in which it has some interest. This assumption was a basic
flaw of Professor Brainerd Currie's unilateralist approach to true
conflicts, resulting in the allocation of excessive authority to the lex
fori (with resultant heightening of the stakes in the matter of
adjudicative jurisdiction).0 8 Currie was, of course, acutely aware of
the weaknesses of his approach in this regard, prompting revisions
of his theories to develop the concept of an "apparent conflict"3 9 and,
with the help of Justice Traynor, the notion of exercising "restraint
and moderation" in the identification of forum state interests.3 10
305. See ALI Principles, supra note 30, § 204.
306. See id. § 321.
307. Soc'y of Composers, Authors & Music Publishers of Can. v. Can. Ass'n of Internet
Providers ('Tariff 22"), [2004] 2 S.C.R. 427 (Can.).
308. See BRAINERD CURRIE, SELECTED ESSAYS ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 182, 278-79
(1963). Currie articulated state interests in terms of maximum application of a state's law and
the vindication of the position of the nationals of that state over foreign nationals. Grounding
sovereignty and national interest in the unceasing application of one's own law is a shaky
premise. It may well be that if a legislature were consciously to address the policies by which
it would seek to regulate international disputes before its courts, it might articulate a
different policy that takes into account the competing interests of other states as well as its
own interest. The latter notion underlying Currie's conception of state interests is inconsistent
with the drive for equal treatment that undergirds the obligation of national treatment and
thus is particularly inappropriate in intellectual property disputes.
309. Apparent conflicts, according to Currie, were cases where "each state would be
constitutionally justified in asserting an interest, but on reflection the conflict is avoided by
a moderate definition of the policy or interest of one state or the other." Brainerd Currie, The
DisinterestedThird State, 28 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 754, 763-65 (1963); see also Robert A.
Sedler, The Government Interest Approachto Choice of Law:An Analysis and a Reformulation,
25 UCLA L. REv. 181, 186-88 (1977).
310. See Currie, supra note 309, at 757-59 (discussing the restrained and enlightened
interpretation of the lex fori); see also Bernkrant v. Fowler, 360 P.2d 906, 909-10 (Cal. 1961);
People v. One 1953 Ford Victoria, 311 P.2d 480, 482-83 (Cal. 1957). By such an approach,
Currie converted the classification of the conflict into a "false conflict," which, according to
Currie's theory, allowed the application of a law other than the lex fori (that is, the law of the
state with the interest).
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If courts should, as this argument suggests, inquire beyond
whether a prescriptive interest merely exists and consider also
broader interests in determining, in a more multilateralist fashion,
whether exclusively to apply its own law, what variables should
inform when to exercise authority?3 1 ' What approach should they
adopt? Two observations can be made here. First courts should view
private international law determinations in the bigger picture of the
international intellectual property system as a whole, including
both public and private aspects.3 12 Thus, developments in public
international law might counsel restraint, a notion that has already
animated U.S. courts fearful of interfering with negotiations by the
executive of alternative means by which to secure international
protection of intellectual property and the global vindication of U.S.
interests.3 13 Second, as the analysis conducted by courts in determining whether to apply U.S. trademark law extraterritorially
demonstrates, results that reflect the reality of an integrated global
market can be achieved by balancinglocal effects against competing
concerns.31 4 These judicial analyses, though often undertaken within
the framework of unilateralist doctrine, evince important multilateralist considerations. Mechanical application of unilateral rules

311. Of course, the legislature may have made it clear that it wishes to exercise jurisdiction
extraterritorially in particular defined circumstances. See Holbrook, supra note 100, at 734
(discussing extraterritorial aspects of U.S. patent statute); see also 17 U.S.C. § 602 (2006)
(covering infringing importation of copies or phonorecords); cf. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d) (2006)
(covering cyberpiracy prevention).
312. Cf. Austin, ImportingKazaa, supra note 260, at 614-15 (suggesting that international
copyright litigation should take into account not only the structural aspects of territoriality
implicit in the Berne Convention, but also the substantive goals of ensuring the effective
protection of authors).
313. Reference to public international copyright lawmaking in adjudicating copyright cases
by U.S. courts has largely been made to support deference to treaty negotiations by the
executive branch and thus to limit litigation of international copyright questions. See, e.g.,
Creative Tech., Ltd. v.Aztech Sys. Pte., Ltd., 61 F.3d 696, 701 (9th Cir. 1995) (referencing
Berne and Universal Copyright Convention in justifying dismissal of international copyright
claim on grounds of forum non conveniens); Subafilms, Ltd. v. MGM-Pathe Commc'ns Co., 24
F.3d 1088, 1098 n.16 (9th Cir. 1994) (en banc) (noting deleterious effect of applying U.S.
copyright law to domestic authorization of allegedly unauthorized acts abroad in light of
Berne accession and TRIPS negotiations).
314. Currie, of course, would object to vesting such a task in the courts, notwithstanding
that locating a conflict within his scheme required an almost identical analysis. See CURIE,
supra note 308, at 182 (explaining that weighing conflicting state interests was a "political
function of a very high order ... that should not be committed to courts in a democracy").
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is likely to produce results insufficiently 315
sensitive to the idiosyncrasituation.
transborder
particular
of
sies
III. LEARNING FROM SPECIFIC PROPOSALS
The concluding Part addresses a specific reform of a core principle
of private international intellectual property law and advocates
greater use of consolidated adjudication of infringement claims
under domestic and foreign intellectual property laws. This is an
area in which unexamined invocation of the principle of territoriality has prevented rational development of a proper private
international law of intellectual property.
A. Reviewing Objections to Adjudication of Foreign Claims
The philosophy of exclusive jurisdiction, and its continuing
vitality, is seen in three of the cases discussed in Part I (Boosey,
GAT, and Voda). This Part argues that courts must depart further
from the position, claimed erroneously to be an inevitable consequence of the principle of territoriality, which vested exclusive
jurisdiction over intellectual property litigation in the courts of the
"country for which protection is sought."31
This doctrine essentially collapsed the questions of adjudicative
and prescriptive jurisdiction. One of the most important contributions of both the ALI Principles and the CLIP Project, is to separate
these two questions. 17 In this regard, these initiatives consolidate
the gains made by courts such as Boosey and, in lesser ways, by the
drafters of the Brussels Convention. However, as seen in GAT and
Roche, and as made clear in the contentious debates surrounding
the broad Hague Convention in 2001 and the narrower choice-of315. See Sterling Drug, Inc. v. Bayer AG, 14 F.3d 733, 747 (2d Cir. 1994).
316. See supra note 65 and accompanying text.
317. See ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 30, § 103(1) ('[C]ompetence to adjudicate does not
imply application of forum law."); id. § 103(2) ("[A] court should not dismiss or suspend
proceedings merely because the dispute raises questions of foreign law."). Although both
projects have retreated from a full rejection of territoriality, see Dinwoodie, Remarks, supra
note 102 at 893 (expressing disappointment at caution), these projects make many other
advances. For example, the explicit and favorable attention to the role of party autonomy in
both projects also helps to liberate intellectual property law from undue restrictions of
territoriality with (at least in the case of the ALl) some appropriate policing of party choice.
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court convention adopted in 2005, the philosophy of exclusive
jurisdiction retains a strong hold on courts and scholars. Its broad
validation limits the efficiency gains of consolidated litigation and
threatens to undermine the maturing of a private international
intellectual property law.
In sketching the principal objections to any retreat from exclusive
jurisdiction, it is worth noting two important distinctions. First,
the principle of exclusive jurisdiction is most strongly asserted
with respect to registered rights such as trademarks and patents
(although its strength is undiminished with respect to unregistered
trademarks in the United States, perhaps because the foreign rights
at issue are typically registered). With copyrights, which by international law come into being without administrative review or
action, exclusive jurisdiction arguments have been weakest. Second,
to the extent there is any present willingness to depart from the
principle in the case of registered rights, this readiness extends only
to questions of infringement. There is widespread consensus that
the validity of registered rights issued by a particular state should
be determined exclusively by the courts of that state. Drawing the
line between validity and infringement is, of course, a point of contention.
Objections to allowing courts to adjudicate claims of infringement
of foreign intellectual property rights fall largely into two basic
groups: legitimacy and competence. The concern of legitimacy is
articulated in different ways. If intellectual property is viewed as a
tool of positive market regulation, rather than a private property
right, exclusive jurisdiction fitted with what Andreas Lowenfeld
called the "public law taboo" of private international law, namely,
the unwillingness of a forum to displace its own public laws or to
apply the public laws of another nation.3 1 Alternatively, some
courts and scholars have justified the doctrine of exclusive jurisdiction on the basis that the administrative determinations of a foreign

318. See ANDREAS F. LOWENFELD, INTERNATIONAL LITIGATION AND THE QUEST FOR
REASONABLENESS: ESSAYS IN PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAw 3-5 (1996); see also Andreas F.

Lowenfeld, Public Law in the InternationalArena: Conflict of Laws, InternationalLaw and
Some Suggestions for their Interaction, 163 RECUEIL DES COURS 311 (1995); Philip J.
McConnaughay, Reviving the 'Public Law Taboo"in InternationalConflict of Laws, 35 STAN.
J. INT'L L. 255, 256 n.2 (1999); supra text accompanying notes 242-45 (discussing relevance
of nature of intellectual property rights).
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patent or trademark office are acts of the administrative officers of
another state, and it would offend international sensibilities to pass
on the correctness of those determinations (as might happen if
courts were able to adjudicate questions of whether the rights
granted were valid).3 19 Yet others have grounded their legitimacy
concerns, at least with respect to patent (although similar, if
weaker, claims might be made with respect to trademark and
copyright), in the function of intellectual property rights. As one
leading English judge has explained:
For myself I would not welcome the task of having to decide
whether a person had infringed a foreign patent. Although
patent actions appear on their face to be disputes between two
parties, in reality they also concern the public. A finding of
infringement is a finding that a monopoly granted by the state
is to be enforced. The result is invariably that the public have to
pay higher prices than if the monopoly did not exist. If that be
the proper result, then that result should, I believe, come about
from a decision of a court situated in the state where the public
have to pay the higher prices. One only has to imagine a decision
of this court that the German public should pay to a British
company substantial sums of money to realise the difficulties
that might arise. I believe that, if the local courts are responsible
for enforcing and deciding questions of validity and infringement, the conclusions reached are likely to command the respect
of the public.32 °
This formulation of the legitimacy objection fades neatly into
the second set of objections, which relate to judicial competence.
Intellectual property laws, it is said, implicate such core questions
of national culture and innovation policy that only judges trained in
and inculcated with the values of the legal system that confers those
rights can properly adjudicate claims with respect to those rights.
One finds fewer courts and scholars resting their support for
exclusive jurisdiction on this basis with the same fervor that
attaches to claims of legitimacy, but that may simply reflect the
different effects of principle and pragmatism on the passion of
advocates. However, competence objections appear to relate prin319. Cf. Voda v. Cordis Corp., 476 F.3d 887, 898-99 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
320. Plastus Kreativ AB v. Minn. Mining & Mfg. Co. [1995] R.P.C. 438, 447 (Eng.).
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cipally to judicial understanding of foreign intellectual property law.
Even domestic intellectual property (especially patent) law is
(unfairly) regarded as arcane by many judges and scholars, and the
prospect of compounding substantive complexity with cultural and
linguistic deficiency is sufficient to suggest that judging intellectual
property cases is best left to those most peculiarly expert in that
role.

32 1

B. Departuresto Date
As noted in Part I, courts in the United States and the European
Union have in the last decade been willing to adjudicate claims
asserted under foreign copyright laws. The objections outlined
above, and in particular the concerns of legitimacy, have been
assuaged by the automatic nature of copyright. Thus, the Boosey
opinion echoed the reasoning of a district court some years earlier,
suggesting that courts should be comfortable hearing foreign
copyright claims because "[i]n adjudicating an infringement action
under a foreign copyright law there is ... no need to pass upon the
validity of acts of foreign government officials,' since foreign
copyright laws, by and large, do not incorporate administrative
formalities which must be satisfied to create or perfect a copyright. '' 322 Stated in the delphic language of private international law,
"copyright infringement constitutes a transitory cause of action, and
hence may be adjudicated in the courts of a sovereign other than
the one in which the cause of action arose.3 23
It is not apparent what constitutes the essential elements of a
"transitory" cause of action; instead, the label appears simply to tell
us that the action is one that can be pursued in a foreign court.
Thus, to understand the heart of the distinction, it is perhaps better
to focus on what persuaded the Boosey court and other courts endorsing the adjudication of foreign copyright claims to do so: the
lack of any foreign administrative agency that has engaged in an act
321. See ITSI T.V. Prods., Inc. v. Cal. Auth. of Racing Fairs, 785 F. Supp. 854, 866 (E.D.
Cal. 1992) (stating that "American courts should be reluctant to enter the bramble bush of
ascertaining and applying foreign law without an urgent reason to do so"), rev'd on other
grounds, 3 F.3d 1289 (9th Cir. 1993).
322. London Film Prods. Ltd. v. Intercontinental Commc'ns, Inc., 580 F. Supp. 47, 49
(S.D.N.Y. 1984) (quoting MELVILLE B. NIMMER 3 ON COPYRIGHT § 1703 (1982)).
323. Id. (footnote omitted).
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of state, and an interest in ensuring that U.S. nationals comply with
foreign intellectual property laws, such that foreign courts might
reciprocate by ensuring compliance with U.S. intellectual property
laws by persons over whom those foreign courts have jurisdiction.
This latter question obviously implicates broader comity concerns
because foreign courts may wish themselves to adjudicate claims
under their own intellectual property laws, both to ensure control
over local enforcement and perhaps to develop an expertise and
body of precedent. But those concerns can be addressed under the
rubric of forum non conveniens and do not require courts to adopt
a per se rule retaining exclusive jurisdiction in the courts of the
country for which protection is sought.32 4
Outside the copyright context, exceptions to the principle of
exclusive jurisdiction have been rarer. Despite the early efforts by
courts operating under the Brussels Convention, courts within the
European Union have, as seen in the cases recently decided before
the ECJ, allowed the assertion of a plea of invalidity to trump any
effort to invoke the liberal jurisdiction provisions as regards
infringement of registered rights that is found in that Convention.
And the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit in Voda declined
to allow claims under foreign patent laws to be consolidated with a
U.S. infringement action. As might be suggested by the uniform
opposition to such a possibility among the organized intellectual
property bar associations that filed amicus briefs in Voda, this
would be regarded as a substantial innovation.
It is an innovation, however, that the ALI Principles pursue
admirably. Thus, section 213(4) of the ALI Principles provides that
"the issue of validity of registered rights granted under the laws of
a foreign country may be adjudicated in any other action [including
an infringement action] brought pursuant to these Principles. 32 5
The ALI Principles do, however, partially recognize the exclusive
jurisdiction claims of a state with respect to the. validity of registered rights by limiting jurisdiction under section 213(4) to a

324. See id. at 50; see also Boosey & Hawkes Music Publishers, Ltd. v. Walt Disney Co., 145
F.3d 481,491-92 (2d Cir. 1998); Creative Tech., Ltd. v. Aztech Sys., Ltd., 61 F.3d 696, 701 (9th
Cir. 1995). Of course, reflecting the importance of separating adjudicative and prescriptive
jurisdiction, the forum will, under the majority choice-of-law rule, still apply the law of the
country or countries for which protection is sought.
325. ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 30, § 213(4).
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"declaration of rights inter se."326 Moreover, "in a proceeding that
has as its sole object the obtaining of a declaration of the invalidity
or nullity of a registered right in only one state, the courts of that
state have jurisdiction to the exclusion of courts of third countries. 3 27 In this fashion, by moderating the effects of the decision of
a foreign court (or, formally, limiting the jurisdiction of the rendering court), the ALI Principles seek to draw a line between validity
and infringement that allows more leeway for consolidated crossborder litigation than would the European Court of Justice. 28
C. Reasons for More Departures
and advanced
The trend evinced by Boosey and the ALI Principles
329
by the plaintiff in Voda should be accelerated.
1. Comity and Legitimacy
It may well be that, as a general matter, decisions of local courts
are likely to command greater respect from the public they regulate
than would decisions of foreign courts. But we allow courts to hear
claims under foreign tort laws, to name but one example, and expect
those decisions on the whole to be enforced and respected in third
countries absent exceptional circumstances. It is a core presumption
of the system of private international law that courts might hear
cases involving the application of foreign law and that, subject to a
deferential review of a limited number of concerns by an enforcing
court, a judgment of the rendering court will be respected. Thus,
the observation by Mr. Justice Aldous regarding the likely public
326. See id.
327. See id. § 213(2).
328. This compromise was first suggested by Professor Curtis Bradley in a paper prepared
for the U.S. State Department officials negotiating the Hague Convention. See Hague
Conference on Private Int'l Law, Special Commission on International Jurisdiction and the
Effect of Foreign Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters (Work Doc. No. 97E Nov. 10-20,
1998). Professor Bradley's proposal is discussed more fully in the Reporters' Notes to the ALI
Principles. See ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 30, § 213, Reporters' Notes.
329. Many of these arguments are also well-articulated in the patent context in the Amicus
Brief of (six) Law Professors filed in Voda v. Cordis Corp., the principal author of which was
Jay Thomas and to which I was a signatory. See Brief for Amicus Curiae, supra note 94. The
leading intellectual property bar associations filed amicus briefs arguing to the contrary and
urging the court to reverse the district court.
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respect only for locally-rendered decisions that affect local economies is unpersuasive absent some special character of intellectual
property law.330
Are there special aspects of intellectual property law that alter
the legitimacy calculus? It is a mantra of those opposing adjudication of foreign industrial property rights that local judicial assessment would offend the comity of foreign nations by passing on the
validity of the acts of a foreign official. But the rendering of a
decision by an American court, for example, cannot of itself effect
the changes in Canada that form the premise of the supposed
offense. No proposed reform would give a court the power to determine the content of a foreign country industrial property register.
Moreover, an interested foreign government is not without means
by which to influence the American court. Prior to the rendering of
a decision, the foreign government can file amicus briefs seeking to
persuade the rendering court both as to the merits of the substantive arguments advanced and to the scope of jurisdiction that the
court should exercise. Moreover, new devices for securing the input
of a foreign state could easily be imagined. To the extent that either
institutional competence or political legitimacy counsels in favor of
certain decisions being made by another institution, the court seized
of the case could refer those questions to that foreign institution.
Reference procedures already exist vertically between state and
federal courts in the U.S. and between national courts and the
European Court of Justice in the EU.331 Indeed, reference procedures are merely a particular variation on a number of "assistance"
devices that courts employ to optimize institutional competence and
ensure fair and efficient proceedings. Hearing evidence on foreign
law, or staying litigation pending developments in parallel proceedings, can also be conceived in those terms.33 2
330. See supra note 319 and accompanying text.
331. See, e.g., Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 549 A.2d 1187, 1190-97 (N.H. 1988)
(answering reference regarding New Hampshire statute of limitations). Of course, the binding
effect of answers under existing reference procedures might be different depending upon
whether the reference consists of a factual or legal question. See Arsenal Football Club PLC
v. Reed, [2003] EWCA (Civ.) 696 (Eng.).
332. We have discretionary limits on how much "assistance" is needed, and we also employ
pragmatic approaches that balance due respect for foreign interests with fair and efficient
adjudication of claims. See FED. R. Civ. P. 44.1; Neil Wilkof, Copyright, Moral Rights and the
Choice of Law: Where Did the Dead Sea Scrolls Court Go Wrong?, 38 HoUS. L. REv. 463, 46673 (2001) (discussing presumption of lex for).
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Even after a decision is rendered, the foreign nation has the
capacity to control those parts of the decision that most intimately
affect its interest. The process of recognition and enforcement allows
the foreign government to give the judgment as much or as little
effect as it wishes. In terms of institutional design, we could devise
a system that gave the judgment merely inter partes effect, as
contemplated by the ALI Principles, or enforcement could be a
matter completely up to the discretion of the enforcing state. And,
of course, in the current treaty-free climate that governs enforcement decisions, these political and institutional choices can already
be pursued.33 3
The extent to which a ruling of a foreign court on a matter
affecting a local interest is the most significant form of inappropriate alien intrusion on a nation's sovereignty needs also to be
carefully reconsidered. Increasingly, it is not state actors, and it is
not judges, who shape local and global policy. Pressure-and, thus,
offense if that pressure succeeds without local input, let alone local
control-can come from a number of sources. The legitimacy critique
ignores the extent to which local markets are regulated from
abroad, not because of direct formal state action, but indirectly
because of commercial decisions precipitated by foreign regulation.3 34 Thus, as noted above in the context of Microsoft v.
Lindows, despite the theoretical independence of rights between the
marks owned by Microsoft in the United States and those existing
under European laws, the determinations by European courts of
claims under Europeanlaws effectively regulated the availability of
the defendant's product in the United States.33 5 This was, by virtue
of overriding commercial concerns, effective regulation of the U.S.
market not only by a foreign court but by a foreign court applying
foreign law. One should not be too sanguine about the capacity of
legal systems in an interdependent world to effect exclusive
regulation of even its local markets.

333. See SARL Louis Feraud Int'l v. Viewfinder Inc., 406 F. Supp. 2d 274,278-85 (S.D.N.Y.
2005), vacated, 489 F.3d 474 (2d Cir. 2007).
334. More generally, commercial pressure and activities are likely to erode national
boundaries more quickly than adjustments in legal regulation because the political units that
effect the latter remain nationally grounded. See generally Dinwoodie, Trademarks and
Territory, supra note 11.
335. See supra Part I.D.5.
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Likewise, intrusion or involvement occurs in ways beyond the
rendering of court decisions that implicate activity or rights in a
foreign state. After the NTP litigation settled, it emerged that "a
Canadian Embassy official contacted the [United States Patent
Office (USPTO)] to see whether it would be advisable to have the
Canadian patent authority try to 'exert an interest or pressure upon
the USPTO regarding' the reexamination of U.S. patents.3 6
Without commenting on the appropriateness of that alternative
form of influence, it surely is less offensive to a foreign nation to
have a court make a determination in open proceedings and after
full briefing that can include submissions by the foreign government
or foreign interests.
Moreover, any decisions to depart from the jurisdictional constraints that U.S. courts see as inherent in territoriality must be
weighed against the effective departures from territorially that
are already occurring in different (and, I would argue, less internationally sensitive) forms. U.S. law frequently has affected extraterritorially and thus regulates foreign markets without, in some of
those circumstances, any regard for foreign interests. For example,
U.S. courts are, through their interpretation of the extended
liability provisions of the patent act, increasingly applying U.S. law
to activities occurring abroad.3 37 Similar results are being achieved
through the localization rule announced in NTP. These policy
decisions appear less respectful of the policy choices of other nations
than adjudicating a case under the laws of the foreign country.3
Many assertions of jurisdiction in circumstances in which there
is extraterritorial effect can be justified by the increased range of
cases involving international exploitation in which the United
States has a prescriptive interest. Such are the inevitable spillover
effects in an integrated global economy in which borders are less
significant. However, the analysis in many of these cases does
not-unlike a procedure in which courts would be willing to
336. Yuki Noguchi, CanadaLobbies for Maker of BlackBerry: Officials Contacting U.S. on
Patent Review, WASH. POST, Feb. 22, 2006, at Di.
337. See Eolas Techs. Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 399 F.3d 1325, 1338-41 (Fed. Cir. 2005)
(interpreting § 271(0 in an expansive manner); cf. Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T Corp., 550 U.S.
437, 441 (2007) (rejecting application of § 271(0 to foreign sales). See generally Holbrook,
supra note 100 (reviewing the different statutory provisions of the Patent Act that modify the
traditional notion of territoriality).
338. Cf. Dinwoodie, A New Copyright Order, supranote 1, at 557 (explaining the relative
offense in ignoring and accommodating state interests in deciding applicable law).
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adjudicate a foreign infringement claim under foreign lawaccommodate the accompanying reality of interdependence, namely
that the prescriptive interest of the United States is increasingly
shared with or subservient to other states.3 39 Yet such respect is an
increasingly important consideration in an interdependent world.
Moreover, none of this liberalization precludes considering the
extent to which the decision, or the proceedings necessary to render
a decision, of a court of one country would intrude upon the sovereignty or legitimate interests of another country in calibrating
adjudicatory and prescriptive jurisdiction. But this does not require
a per se rule of exclusive jurisdiction. At present, the rule of exclusive jurisdiction in patent law operates as a jurisdictional bar. As
in copyright law over the past eight years, courts in patent and
trademark cases should not regard the involvement of a foreign
right as ipso facto warranting dismissal, but rather should take that
factor into account in determining whether to assume or decline
jurisdiction. Likewise, the mere fact that a case has some connection
to U.S. activity or U.S. rights should not mean that the U.S. courts
should be the sole adjudicator or U.S. law the sole determinant of
the outcome of the dispute.
Legitimacy concerns such as those that have sustained exclusive
jurisdiction rules are also often raised (more softly) as a consideration in forum non conveniens analysis and in determining whether
to apply the Lanham Act extraterritorially. In a world of inevitably
overlapping markets, such devices are more appropriate vehicles for
recognition of the interests of foreign states in controlling their local
markets and their local industrial property registers than per se
exclusive jurisdiction rules.
Finally, courts in other countries are beginning to shed their
historical reluctance to adjudication of foreign intellectual property
(including patent) claims.3 4 ° As a result, liberalization of U.S.
conflicts rules would be less likely to cause international offense.
Indeed, such an approach could contribute to an international
understanding about cross-border enforcement of rights in ways
that further the substantive objectives of patent law.
339. Cf. id. at 578 (noting equivalent comparison in context of applicable law).
340. See K.K. Coral Corp. v. Marine Bio I.K., Hesei 02 (Wa) 1943 (D. Tokyo Oct. 16, 2003);
see also Nahoko Ono, Cross-Border Patent: The Coral Powder Case, Where Japan Court
Applies the U.S. Law, Report Prepared for Annual Meeting of ATRIP (Montreal, July 13,
2005), available at http://www.atrip.org/upload/files/activities/Montreal2005/ono.doc.
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2. Competence
Competence to adjudicate an intellectual property case implicates
at least two core skills: understanding the law and understanding
facts. With respect to both components, recent developments make
it highly likely that judges have the competence to adjudicate claims
under foreign intellectual property laws. On the matter of legal
knowledge, the TRIPS Agreement and broader public law harmonization have caused a convergence of legal norms, such that the
applicable rules in cases involving foreign patent claims are unlikely
to deviate substantially from those found in domestic law. This
politically induced external convergence has been aided by the fact
that intellectual property judges are, like many judges, the beneficiaries of the increasingly frequent transborder conversations that
take place among similarly situated professionals, judges, administrators, and lawyers, and that contribute to the soft socially driven
convergence of ideas. 4 1 At the very least, these conversations ensure
a greater awareness of foreign laws and foreign legal cultures. This
phenomenon, which should assuage competence fears, is heightened
by the fact that there is a clear trend toward specialized judges in
intellectual property disputes. The specialization ensures that
intellectual property judges speak the same argot and constructs a
closer community that more easily experiences the conditions just
described.
Perhaps more importantly, however, it is the factual aspects of a
patent case that are hard. The law, despite what intellectual
property lawyers might like to pretend, is not any harder than other
areas of practice or study. At an ALI Advisers Meeting, one judge
was reported to have claimed that it took eight weeks of learning the
science involved in a patent case before being able to start assessing
the legal arguments. A body of scientific knowledge is not nationally
structured. Even if the invention, as defined de iure in the claims of
the patent, may vary from one country to another depending upon
the vagaries of the prosecution process, the invention that de facto
is claimed to be subject to protection and the product that is alleged
to be infringing are likely to be very similar, if not identical. At the
very least, the body of background knowledge necessary to under341. There are a number of international intellectual property judges' conferences; and
these judges are often in attendance at academic conferences internationally.
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stand the technology at issue will be common. Serial litigation
compels that this background knowledge, rather than the legal rules
of different nations, be learned by a multiplicity of national judges.
The efficiency costs of that process are far more serious than the
learning costs of well-informed judges becoming more aware of
foreign law.34 2
Of course, there are other objections that might derail this reform
of jurisdictional rules. For example, as the European Court of
Justice noted in GAT, there is the prospect of satellite litigation
prompted by jurisdictional jockeying. And consolidated litigation
may in fact generate additional costs if the evidence is, for example,
in a number of foreign languages.343 But in certain cases, this
objection will be of greater weight than in others. Thus, the roots of
the respective patents in a common PCT application not only make
it more likely that the patents will be similar, but may also, in
practice, ameliorate some of the language concerns raised by
different national patent grants. 4 4
It may also be feared that judges hearing a consolidated intellectual property case involving slightly different (but related) national
intellectual properties under different national laws may assume,
for ease of convenience, that the property and the law is constant
among causes of action. As a result, judges may, through consolidated litigation, eviscerate differences among national intellectual
property laws that are a conscious and important component of the
international intellectual property system. 45 One of the attractions
of consolidated litigation to those who believe strongly in the
continued sovereignty of nation states to dictate their innovation
policy is that the ability to sue for global relief in a single court
might persuade plaintiffs to avoid the alternative global strategy of
obtaining extraterritorial relief from a single court. This latter
form of cross-border relief displays far less respect for the interests
of other states than adjudication of foreign claims. Again, this is a
genuine concern. However, that form of judicial homogenization
may already be occurring in our current system as judges develop
342. Information about foreign patent laws is now more readily available, aided perhaps
by the use of English as lingua franca.
343. See also supra note 120.
344. See Voda v. Cordis Corp., 476 F.3d 887, 906-10 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (Newman, J.,
dissenting).
345. See Dinwoodie, Trademarksand Territory,supranote 11, at 960 (discussing this fear).
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awareness of parallel litigation through the growth of specialized
judicial networks. And the risks of judicial assimilation through
assumptions of identity (though real) are no less destructive of
difference than global application of a single law through generous
localization devices or extraterritorial application of domestic law.
Finally, it might be argued that the ability to consolidate litigation would concentrate decision-making power in large countries
such as the United States with substantial judicial resources. This
too is clearly a legitimate concern.3 4 However, others have argued
that, for example, making the competition law of developing
countries be justiciable before U.S. courts might allow the developing countries to take advantageof those resources and the accumulated expertise of the developed world.34 v This is one variation on the
tension inherent in the supply of what WIPO calls "technical expertise." More importantly, taking it as a valid concern, it is a factor
that can be accommodated in the decision whether and where to
rather than through adhering to a rule of
consolidate proceedings,
348
jurisdiction.
exclusive
CONCLUSION

Territoriality is a principle with strong prescriptive appeal, both
in intellectual property and beyond. However, its operation in
intellectual property law has always played too substantial a role in
preventing the proper development of principles of private international law. The time has come for that to change.

346. See Dinwoodie, A New Copyright Order, supra note 1, at 521 (addressing that
argument in applicable law context).
347. See Carsten Fink, Address at the Duke University Conference on International Public
Goods and Transfer of Technology Under a Globalized Intellectual Property Regime: The
Critical Role of Competition Law in Preserving Public Goods (Apr. 6, 2003) (reporting these
arguments).
348. See Creative Tech., Ltd. v. Aztech Sys. Pte., Ltd., 61 F.3d 696, 704-09 (9th Cir. 1995)
(Ferguson, J., dissenting); see also ALI Principles, supranote 30, § 206.

